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INCREMENTALISM: ERODING THE IMPEDIMENTS
TO A GLOBAL PUBLIC PROCUREMENT MARKET
CHRISTOPHER R. YUKINS & STEVEN L. SCHOONER*
ABSTRACT
Following decades of international negotiations and agreements, the world’s
multi-trillion-dollar public procurement market appears to be maturing into a
free, open international market. To reach that point, nations must lower a broad
array of barriers to trade in procurement. As the U.S. experience demonstrates,
purchasing agencies, laboring under the constraints of domestic preferences, may
effectively seek to promote free trade. At the same time, a variety of international
organizations, from the World Trade Organization to Transparency Interna-
tional, have developed tools and instruments—including model codes and
explicit nondiscrimination agreements—that ease barriers to trade in procure-
ment. To accelerate the erosion of these barriers, this Article suggests assessing
progress in four potentially overlapping steps: nondiscrimination, a political
decision; harmonization, an effort to coordinate the international instruments;
rationalization, an effort to enhance the efficiency of regimes launched under the
international instruments; and, institutionalization, an integration of the
evolving international procurement norms into the legal fabric of the nations
entering the international free market in procurement.
INTRODUCTION
After centuries of isolationism, the world’s public procurement
markets are emerging as a progressively integrated, open market. This
trend accelerates as nations agree—by treaty, agreement, and prac-
tice—to open their respective procurement markets to outside compe-
tition. Trade liberalization in this sphere remains controversial,1 as
* Christopher R. Yukins is Associate Professor of Government Contract Law and Steven L.
Schooner is Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at The George Washington University
Law School. © 2007 Christopher R. Yukins and Steven L. Schooner. Both co-direct the law school’s
Government Procurement Law Program. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the
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2007). The authors acknowledge the generous support of the Seymour Herman Faculty Research
Fund in Government Procurement Law, and thank Frederick Lawrence for his support and
insights, and Maria Aspiazu and Daniel Greenspahn for their diligent research assistance.
1. Because our focus is limited to public procurement, we do not endeavor here to catalogue
the literature favoring free trade. Conversely, we remain cognizant that the free trade literature is
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many states, particularly developing nations,2 fear that opening their
markets will expose domestic industries to crushing competition. Expe-
rience suggests, however, that by opening their procurement markets,
nations serve their own procurement systems and domestic economies
by gaining access to a richer and more diverse pool of goods and
services, often at more competitive prices. Concomitantly, these states
benefit as foreign markets open to their own producers. Opening an
increasing number of public procurement markets may be the most
important development in procurement today. Although it is an encour-
aging trend, the process likely will require at least a generation to
mature.
As this process unfolds, individual states must identify the barriers to
foreign contractor entry posed by domestic procurement rules. Public
procurement law—especially the legal regimes that govern public
contract formation3—often erects a dense, twisted web of rules, which
not uniformly accepted. See, e.g., David Wessel & Bob Davis, Pain From Free Trade Spurs Second
Thoughts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2007, at A1 (noting that a critique of free trade by economist,
former Federal Reserve Board vice chairman, and perennial free-trade advocate, Alan S. Blinder
“comes as public skepticism about allowing an unfettered flow of goods, services, people and
money across borders is intensifying, including some Republicans as well as many Democrats”).
Further,
[Blinder suggests that] a new industrial revolution—communication technology that
allows services to be delivered electronically from afar—will put as many as 40 million
American jobs at risk of being shipped out of the country in the next decade or two [,
and that’s] . . . “only the tip of a very big iceberg . . . .” Mr. Blinder’s answer is not
protectionism . . . . He wants government to do far more for displaced workers . . . [and
h]e thinks the U.S. education system must be revamped so it prepares workers for jobs
that can’t easily go overseas, and is contemplating changes to the tax code that would
reward companies that produce jobs that stay in the U.S.
Id.
2. For example, an informative contrast to the prevalent Western free-trade literature can be
found in the India-based Consumer Unity & Trust Society Centre for International Trade,
Economics & Environment (“CUTS CITEE”). CUTS CITEE’s “philosophy is ‘liberalisation yes,
but with safety nets.’” See generally CUTS Centre for International Trade, Economics & Environ-
ment, http://www.cuts-citee.org/.
3. In the United States, clear legal and pedagogical lines distinguish between the formation
and the performance (or administration or management) of a government contract. Briefly, the
formation process begins with acquisition planning, revolves around the government’s solicitation
(e.g., invitation for bids, request for proposals, or request for quotations), depends in large part
upon the government’s evaluation criteria (e.g., lowest price technically acceptable, best value, or
proven past performance), and concludes with the selection of a contractor and award of a
contract. Typical legal challenges during all phases of this process—whether alleging inequities or
ambiguities in the solicitation, restrictions on competition, or award improprieties—are known as
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may impede (and frequently intimidates) potential foreign entrants. As
international instruments focused on public procurement emerged
over the past few decades, most were intended, at least in part, to ease
those artificial barriers to entry.
At a broad, conceptual level, this market-opening initiative appears
to proceed in four somewhat irregular phases. First, and perhaps most
controversially, states must embrace nondiscrimination as a policy that
will, on balance, benefit those nations that adopt it. This is a highly
political calculation, and it may take decades for some nations to
acknowledge and accept it. Second, to facilitate market-opening, the
instruments for international cooperation on procurement should be
harmonized. This nascent process appears to be gaining momentum
through various international agreements and structures. Harmoniza-
tion itself reduces barriers to trade because it reduces transaction costs
for vendors crossing borders. Simultaneously, harmonization eases the
transition to a common procurement market, based on common
instruments. Third, as states harmonize their public procurement
instruments, rather than using the lowest common denominator (typically,
corruption control) as a baseline, these instruments should be rational-
ized to ensure optimal procurement functions. Doing so will pay divi-
dends through enhanced efficiency and, at a political level, will lend
the rationalized instruments more legitimacy as a tool for develop-
ment.4 Fourth, the regulatory regimes shaped by the instruments
should be institutionalized, to integrate the new rules into the fabric of
bid protests or disappointed offeror litigation. Contrast this with the performance phase, in which
the contract, replete with standard remedy-granting clauses intended to anticipate every conceiv-
able contingency, defines the contracting parties’ responsibilities to, for example, perform a
service or deliver a good in exchange for the payment of money, which fulfills the government’s
obligation and concludes the relationship. Contract disputes that arise during performance may
involve, for example, delays, failure to comply with specifications, and modifications to, or
termination of, the contract.
4. Two leading economists put the case for efficient procurement markets this way:
Efficiency in government procurement is of importance in ensuring that the best value
for money is obtained by public entities. Procurement practices also figure prominently
in the way that many potential investors and civil society view a country. Ensuring
transparency of the procurement process is an important determinant of efficiency
insofar as it enhances the contestability of public procurement markets (by giving all
qualified potential suppliers a chance to bid). If procurement procedures are opaque
and discretionary, the incentive for firms to enter into a market are typically reduced.
The same problem arises if it is possible for firms to obtain “preferred status” through
bribery of officials and potential entrants do not know how to “play by the rules of the
game.”
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each nation’s existing procurement law.
Our aim here is not mere advocacy for open procurement markets,
although we favor such a result. The case for open public markets,
ultimately, is a simple one for economists, agency procurement offi-
cials, and elected officials to make. Rather, our modest goal is to
describe the critical legal and practical milestones as the historically
chaotic and balkanized collection of protectionist public procurement
regimes5 evolves toward a unified, open, and ultimately global market.
Accordingly, we begin, in Part I, by opining that, despite the never-
ending succession of acquisition reform initiatives in the United States
and abroad, the most significant development in public procurement
today may be the incremental opening of an increasing number of
public procurement markets across the globe. Although this nascent
trend necessarily will span decades, and no doubt will proceed in fits
and starts, we are heartened by what we perceive as increasing momen-
tum. For the trend to accelerate, states must not only identify, but
overcome, longstanding and often instinctively erected barriers to
entry. Part II discusses the identification of individual states’ procure-
ment rules that both explicitly and implicitly serve as barriers to foreign
firms’ entry into those states’ domestic procurement markets. Part III
traces the role that certain legal and policy instruments may play in
opening world procurement markets. We discuss three types of instru-
ments that, intentionally or fortuitously, may liberalize international
procurement markets: (1) model procurement codes or model state-
ments of principle; (2) procurement guidelines imposed by central
financial institutions; and (3) binding international agreements or
directives that require nondiscrimination. Finally, in Part IV, we offer a
rubric or four-stage process through which we expect the global
procurement market to pass in order to fully achieve openness. These
potentially overlapping stages include: (1) acceptance of nondiscrimi-
nation (in lieu of protectionism) as a norm; (2) harmonization of the
fundamental aspects of public procurement regimes; (3) rationaliza-
tion of procurement practices in the pursuit of commonly accepted
Simon J. Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman, International Cooperation and the Reform of Public
Procurement Policies 32 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3720, Sept. 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract821424.
5. Federico Trionfetti, Discriminatory Public Procurement and International Trade, 23 WORLD
ECONOMY 57, 73 (2000), available at http://www.univ-paris13.fr/CEPN/1467_9701_00262.pdf
(“[G]overnments exhibit consistently lower import share than the private economy. This evidence
supports the hypothesis that government purchases are home biased.”).
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aspirations for successful procurement regimes, such as achieving value
for money, efficiency, and customer satisfaction (rather than, in con-
trast, wealth distribution); and (4) institutionalization or the incorpora-
tion of harmonized, rationalized agreements into the legal fabric of the
states that adopt these procurement practices. We optimistically con-
clude that liberalized procurement markets will enhance the value of
money states expend procuring goods and services and, as a result, will
provide better service to the constituencies those states ultimately
serve.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF OPENING THE INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT
MARKET
There are many reasons to open the international procurement
market, including, of course, the sheer size of the market and its impact
upon both the public and private sectors.6 The Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) estimated that
total world procurement amounted to approximately $5.5 trillion in
1998.7 During fiscal year 2007, the United States federal procurement
market alone will account for approximately $400 billion,8 an amount
that reflects continued growth on top of the roughly 75 percent
increase experienced from FY2000 to FY2005.
As governments increasingly rely upon the private sector to perform
governmental functions, we expect this trend of public procurement
6. “Government procurement ranges from eight to ten percent of the gross domestic
product of major OECD countries, and this share is even larger in developing countries.” Hiroshi
Ohashi, Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of
Municipal Public Works, http://www.mfj.gr.jp/lunch_seminar/documents/ohashipaper.pdf. “Gov-
ernment procurement . . . typically accounts for between 12 and 19% of EU Member State’s
[GDP].” UK Department of Trade & Industry, http://www.dti.gov.uk/europeandtrade/key-trade-
issues/procurement/page23706.html; “Such purchases [of goods, works and services] by public
bodies represent about 14% of the EU’s total [GDP].” International Local Government Association,
Public Procurement, http://international.lga.gov.uk/european_work/democracy/public
Procurement/index.html.
7. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
MARKETS 25, 34 (2002) [hereinafter OECD REPORT], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
34/14/1845927.pdf.
8. “Each year Federal agencies spend nearly $400 billion for a range of goods and services to
meet their mission needs.” ACQUISITION ADVISORY PANEL, REPORT OF THE ACQUISITION ADVISORY
PANEL TO THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY AND THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1 (Draft
Final Report, Dec. 2006) [hereinafter AAP DRAFT REPORT], available at http://www.acquisition.gov/
comp/aap/documents/DraftFinalReport.pdf. Of course, these figures exclude procurement by
the fifty States, municipalities, and regional authorities.
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growth to continue.10
By necessity, market-opening agreements typically are reciprocal.
Thus, a nation’s decision to open its domestic market will almost always
increase that nation’s firms’ access to the vast international public
procurement market. More robust opportunities in industrialized na-
tions’ procurement markets suggest that developing nations have more
to gain from reciprocal access to procurement markets in industrial-
ized nations.11 The alternative—leaving a domestic market closed—
may impose significant costs on the protectionist nation, both in terms
of paying higher prices to less efficient domestic firms or, more often,
foreclosing access to superior goods and services. Moreover, protection-
9. See Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation, https://www.fpds.gov (click on
“Trending Analysis Report for the Last 5 Years” link). For more statistical data, see also
FedSpending.org, recently created by OMB Watch, at http://www.fedspending.org.
10. The recent draft report from the distinguished Acquisition Advisory Panel chronicled the
government’s transition, in the span of a single generation, from a purchaser of supplies to a
service consumer:
Services now comprise a greater percentage of the government’s acquisition budget.
Between 1990 and 1995 the government began spending more on services than goods.
Currently, procurement spending on services accounts for more than 60% of total
procurement dollars. In FY 2005, DOD obligated more than $141 billion on service
contracts, a 72% increase since FY 1999.
AAP DRAFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 2-3 (footnotes omitted).
11. See OECD REPORT, supra note 7, at 23, 25 (noting that in 1998, government expenditures
in OECD countries totaled $4.7 trillion versus $0.8 trillion in non-OECD nations); see also Bernard
M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government
Procurement 4-5 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 1429, Mar. 1995), available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?ImgPagePK64202990&entityID000009265_
3970311121546&menuPK64168175&pagePK64210502&theSitePK544849&piPK64210520.
U.S. FEDERAL PUBLIC PROCUREMENT FISCAL YEARS 2000-20059
Fiscal
Year
Transactions
(in millions)
Dollars
(in billions)
Percentage
increase
2005 10.8 $382 10.2
2004 10.5 $346 13.5
2003 11.5 $305 22.1
2002 8.65 $250 6.5
2001 11.4 $234 7.3
2000 9.8 $218 –
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ist policies ignore the realities of the global marketplace, particularly in
the context of commercial items, where firms unavoidably depend
upon a global supply chain. While the topic remains unsettled and
controversial,12 past studies have identified welfare losses in those
countries with high barriers to procurement trade.13 Indeed, as the
U.S. experience discussed below shows, customer agencies may resist
domestic preferences more aggressively than their elected leadership,
as they more acutely feel the pinch of those welfare losses.
II. PROCUREMENT RULES AS (INHERENTLY UNSTABLE) BARRIERS
Procurement rules serve as explicit and implicit barriers to foreign
firms’ entry into domestic procurement markets. Professor Sue Arrow-
smith’s authoritative text, Government Procurement in the WTO, describes
four relevant categories of procurement rules that serve as barriers to
nations’ procurement markets. These are: (1) measures to provide
domestic industry with a competitive advantage; (2) secondary objec-
tives of a non-economic nature; (3) illegitimate practices including
corruption, nepotism, and patronage; and, (4) conventional domestic
procurement rules concerned with the “commercial” aspects of procure-
ment and efforts to achieve an efficient domestic procurement pro-
cess.14 Drawing on the U.S. experience, we employ this conceptual
structure to demonstrate why fissures are emerging in these rules-based
barriers.
12. See, e.g., Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 11; SIMON J. EVENETT & BERNARD HOEKMAN,
THE WTO AND GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT (2006) (providing a very accessible review of the
economic literature on discrimination in procurement); George Deltas & Simon J. Evenett,
Quantitative Estimates of the Effects of Preference Policies (2000), reprinted in EVENETT & HOEKMAN, supra,
at 302 (“price preference policies generate at best only marginal improvements in social welfare
. . . . However, even small price preferences are found to generate substantial increases in the
domestic firm’s expected profits . . . .”); Vivek Srivastava, India’s Accession to the Government
Procurement Agreement: Identifying Costs and Benefits (2003), reprinted in EVENETT & HOEKMAN, supra, at
460.
13. See, e.g., OECD REPORT, supra note 7, 15-17 (reviewing literature on costs of domestic
preferences); SUE ARROWSMITH, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN THE WTO 8-11 (2003); see Robert E.
Baldwin & J. David Richardson, Government Purchasing Policies, Other NTB’s, and the International
Monetary Crisis (1972), reprinted in EVENETT & HOEKMAN, supra note 12, at 235 (economic modeling
to show relatively marginal impact of U.S. procurement preferences on overall trade deficit);
Aaditya Mattoo, The Government Procurement Agreement: Implications of Economic Theory (1996),
reprinted in EVENETT & HOEKMAN, supra note 12, at 276 (predicting that GPA members may be
willing to forego nondiscrimination in favor of other transparency and efficiency gains as other
nations join GPA).
14. See ARROWSMITH, supra note 13, at 13-19.
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A. Measures to Protect Domestic Industry: Assessing Developments Under the
Berry Amendment’s Specialty Metals Ban
One common form of trade barrier is those explicit measures to
provide domestic industry with a competitive advantage over foreign competitors.
Historically, “the United States operated significant overt policies,
generally embodied in legislation”—the Buy American Act15 is the
most obvious example—“whilst the policies of many of its major
trading partners, including most European states, were more covert.”16
The obvious preferences (and barriers) raised by the Buy American Act
have, for the most part, been overtaken by the United States’ obliga-
tions under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Government Pro-
curement Agreement, discussed below.17
Throughout the U.S. procurement system, however, less obvious
domestic preferences continue to thrive.18 Recently, for example, the
U.S. Congress made substantial revisions to the Berry Amendment,19 a
decades-old piece of legislation which requires the U.S. Department of
Defense to purchase certain items only from U.S. producers, including
15. See generally 48 C.F.R. § 25.100-.105 (citing 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a - 10d and Exec. Order 10582
(Dec. 17, 1954)). Title 48 of the C.F.R. is the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) system,
“established for the codification and publication of uniform policies and procedures for acquisi-
tion by all executive agencies. The Federal Acquisition Regulations System consists of the . . . [FAR],
which is the primary document, and agency acquisition regulations that implement or supple-
ment the FAR.” 48 C.F.R. § 1.101. The current, official version of the FAR is available online
through Acquisition Central, www.acquisition.gov, the Federal government’s single-point-of-entry
for the acquisition community, at http://www.acquisition.gov/far/.
16. ARROWSMITH, supra note 13, at 15.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 127-31.
18. See Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law, 11 PUB.
PROC. L. REV. 103 (2002).
[W]ealth distribution is merely a subset of the larger phenomenon of burdening the
procurement process (or, for that matter, the process of governing) with efforts to
promote social policies. These social policies, in addition to those that potentially
distribute wealth to domestic manufacturers, essential military suppliers, and small
(and small disadvantaged and women-owned) businesses, also mandate drug-free
workplaces, occupational safety standards, compliance with labor laws, [and] prefer-
ences for environmentally friendly purchasing practices . . . .
Id. at 108 n.28.
19. The so-called Berry Amendment was handled as an amendment to appropriations acts
for many years, until Congress passed section 832 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. 107-107, 115 Stat. 1012, 1019 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2533(a) (2007)).
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clothing and specialty metals, the subject of recent legislation.20
With regard to specialty metals, the Berry Amendment poses enor-
mous compliance challenges for the Department of Defense and its
contractors.21 Titanium and certain alloys, for example, are critical to
the sophisticated electronics and weapons systems regularly procured
by the U.S. military. Yet these and other specialty metals covered by the
current ban are often, according to industry, difficult to access in the
domestic U.S. market, and the Defense Department has scrambled to
make sense of the Berry Amendment’s blanket ban.22
1. A Troubling but Informative Anecdote
The Berry Amendment’s ban on specialty metals offers an interest-
ing case study in domestic-content requirements for several reasons.
First, because it calls for domestic specialty metals in a highly mecha-
nized military, the requirement intrudes into almost every corner and
crevice of the defense complex, wherever specialty metals are used—
from aircraft to weapons to computers. Unlike other domestic-content
requirements that simply lend domestic products a price preference
(such as the requirements of the Buy American Act), the Berry Amend-
ment wholly bars the Defense Department from buying any item that
contains foreign specialty metals absent exceptional circumstances.
Second, the pervasive impact of the absolute bar against foreign
specialty metals divides the U.S. specialty metals industry from the
Defense Department and its major contractors.23 Third, the debate
shows how a global economy reorders the politics of domestic prefer-
20. See Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment, Procurement Reform in the Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2007—A Creature of Compromise, Pointing the Way to Future Debates, 48 GOV’T
CONTRACTOR ¶ 367 (2006). See generally John W. Chierichella & David S. Gallacher, Feature
Comment, Specialty Metals and the Berry Amendment—Frankenstein’s Monster and Bad Domestic Policy,
46 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 168 (2004).
21. This is not the first time that aspects of the Berry Amendment have bedeviled the defense
procurement process. See generally Steven L. Schooner, Feature Comment, Buying the “Black Beret”:
Balancing Customer “Needs” and Socio-Economic Policies, 43 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 158 (2001) (discuss-
ing a congressional mandate involving domestic manufacture of military uniform items).
22. See, e.g., Air Force Failed to Follow Policy on Berry Amendment Waivers, 2 INT’L GOV’T
CONTRACTOR ¶ 79 (2005).
23. See Roxana Tiron, U.S. Titanium Industry Defending its Territory, THE HILL, Mar. 16, 2006,
available at http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHill/News/TheExecutive/031606_tita-
nium.html; Roxana Tiron, Specialty-Metals Industry Clashes with Defense Giants, Pentagon, THE HILL,
May 16, 2006, available at http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHill/Business/051606_
barry.html; Roxana Tiron, Glint of Steel in Clash over Specialty Metals, THE HILL, June 13, 2006,
available at http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHill/Business/061306_berry.html.
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ences. Traditionally, most domestic-content requirements have left
purchasing agencies uneasily allied with domestic industry. The agen-
cies typically have been willing to bear the additional costs of domestic
preferences in order to further other social or political goals. Now, as is
discussed below, purchasing agencies’ new decision to demand flexibil-
ity (rather than slavishly adhere to a domestic preference mandate)
highlights the internal fissures that undermine traditional domestic
preferences. Agencies and contractors, under pressure to utilize the
collective strength of a global supply chain, cannot indefinitely abide
arbitrary political demands to accommodate self-interested domestic
industries.
2. A Tortured History
The Berry Amendment’s absolute bar against specialty metals is so
severe and disruptive that the Defense Department has shifted to a
stance of cautious opposition to the ban.24 Throughout 2006, while
proposed legislation to amend the Berry Amendment remained stalled
in Congress, the Defense Department issued a number of guidance
documents to its agencies, and to its contractors, as they struggled to
comply with the specialty metals ban.
In February 2006, the U.S. Defense Contract Management Agency
(DCMA) issued guidance, updated in March, which emphasized that
foreign specialty metals would not be accepted in items delivered to the
Defense Department, but that—in very limited circumstances—items
that contained “nonconforming” specialty metals could be accepted
“conditionally,” with a corresponding reduction in price.25 In June
2006—after the House had passed proposed expansions to the spe-
cialty metals ban—senior leadership in the Defense Department en-
dorsed the earlier DCMA guidance.26 The Defense Department’s state-
ment of position reflected its continuing concern with the Berry
Amendment ban. Although the Under Secretary of Defense acknowl-
24. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administra-
tion Policy: S. 2766—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, at 2 (2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/109-2/s2766sap-s.pdf (indicating
Bush administration support for Section 823 of the Senate defense authorization bill, which would
have provided limited authority to waive domestic content requirements).
25. See DCMA, Interim Instruction, Noncompliance with the Preference for Specialty Metals
Clause, DFARS 252.225-7014 (Feb. 2006/rev. Mar. 10, 2006), available at http://guidebook.
dcma.mil/225/instructions.htm.
26. See Memorandum from U.S. Under Secretary of Defense Kenneth J. Krieg (June 1, 2006),
available at http://guidebook.dcma.mil/225/dc06-183USD(AT&L).pdf.
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edged “that certain specialty metal parts used in the performance of
some defense contracts may be non-compliant with the Berry Amend-
ment,” he emphasized that “in some cases, the delay that would be
caused by immediately pursuing certain remedies may seriously impact
our ability to meet military needs.”27 In memoranda dated August 18,
2006 and September 21, 2006,28 Shay Assad, the Director of Defense
Procurement and Acquisition Policy, issued guidance to Defense agen-
cies on accepting items with non-compliant specialty metals. The
August 2006 memorandum acknowledged that compliance could lead
to higher costs, and the September 2006 memorandum noted that
contractors may be unable to trace their supply chains completely, to
keep out all “foreign” specialty metals in items delivered to the Defense
Department. Taken together, the 2006 guidance made clear the De-
fense Department’s concern that the specialty metals ban was expen-
sive and disruptive.
Indeed, in a May 2006 statement the Bush administration threatened
to veto a draft defense authorization bill that would have substantially
broadened the Berry Amendment’s requirements if the domestic
preferences were enhanced, an extraordinary threat to a then-
Republican Congress, in a time of war:
The Administration strongly opposes legislative provisions . . .
that would undermine the longstanding U.S. policy—repeat-
edly affirmed by Congress—to open U.S. procurement markets
to suppliers from allied and friendly countries that open their
procurement markets to U.S. suppliers. These sections could
jeopardize our military readiness when our objective should be
to enhance our ability to get the best capability for the warf-
ighter at the best value for the taxpayer. Such provisions would
restrict U.S. suppliers’ access to foreign markets; would de-
crease competition; increase costs for U.S. taxpayers; and unnec-
essarily add red tape to the procurement process. DoD suppli-
ers rely on global supply chains for materials, often without
knowing the country of origin. . . . These . . . sections, which
would require domestic sources for all critical items, fail to
27. Id.
28. See Memorandum from Shay D. Assad, Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition
Policy to Commander, U.S. Special Operations (Aug. 18, 2006), available at http://www.acq.osd.
mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/2006-1445-DPAP.pdf; Memorandum from Shay D. Assad, Director,
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy to Commander, U.S. Special Operations (Sept. 21,
2006), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/2006-1788-DPAP.pdf.
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recognize that it is acceptable to rely on dependable foreign
sources from allied and friendly countries for many critical
items. Unwillingness to rely on such dependable foreign sources
would undermine future efforts to build coalitions. . . . In addi-
tion, Section 1211 would prohibit procurements from any
entity that has exported or transferred certain items linked to
the U.S. Munitions List to the People’s Republic of China,
causing irreparable damage to DoD’s efforts to implement a
strategy of world-wide engagement with allies and friendly
nations. If the President is presented a bill that includes such provi-
sions, his senior advisors will recommend that he veto the bill.29
As the Bush administration’s message reflected, practical and politi-
cal demands pushed the specialty metals ban directly into the colliding
paths of domestic preferences and policy. Despite strong congressional
support for the domestic specialty metals industry, the Bush administra-
tion fought hard to reduce barriers to the U.S. procurement market
because of the forces aligned against the specialty metals preference:
the need for U.S. agencies to access foreign materials; the additional
costs and inefficiency that the preference forces on U.S. prime contrac-
tors and their international supply chains (costs that ultimately the
United States itself must bear, in large part); and, finally, the severe
impact that domestic preferences can have on U.S. foreign policy,
which increasingly relies on strong international alliances. This “new
triumvirate”—U.S. agencies drawing aggressively on foreign suppliers,
a globalized U.S. contractor community, and potentially angry foreign
allies—make the Berry Amendment’s specialty metals preference inher-
ently unstable.
The Defense Department’s opposition to the specialty metals ban
forced Congress to revisit the requirement. Caught between competing
demands from defense suppliers, the specialty metals industry, and the
Defense Department itself, Congress compromised. The John Warner
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007,30 which Presi-
dent George W. Bush signed into law on October 17, 2006, contained
29. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administra-
tion Policy: H.R. 5122—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, at 2 (2006)
(emphasis in original), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/109-2/
hr5122sap-h.pdf.
30. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat.
2083 (2006).
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several measures intended to ease the Berry Amendment’s ban.31
Specifically, Section 842 of the act established a new specialty metals
provision, which “carved out” specialty metals from the other Berry
Amendment prohibitions (textiles, etc.).32 The new statute defined
specialty metals in accord with standing Defense Department rules,33
but left open the possibility that other metals will be added in the
future based on studies of critical materials by a special board created
in the Department of Defense. The new statute gave the Defense
Department authority to waive the specialty metals ban if insufficient
domestic specialty metals are available or if contractors could reason-
ably explain noncompliance. The statute also exempted smaller procure-
ments (under $100,000), purchases of electronic components of “de
minimis” value, and sole-source procurements done under “unusual
and compelling urgency.”34
Most importantly from an international trade perspective, the new
statute left in place the exemptions created by treaty and agreement for
those specialty metals incorporated into defense items in qualifying
nations. This is an anomalous and telling exception in a highly-
industrialized nation,35 for it means that the specialty metals ban does
not impede U.S. trading partners’ in exporting completed defense items to
the United States, even if those items contain foreign specialty metals.
Instead, the ban is meant to—and does—impede only transnational
trade in a material, i.e., specialty metals.
In passing the new statute, however, Congress opted not to treat the
Berry Amendment as a blunt tool to enrich the domestic specialty
metals industry—that would be difficult to sustain politically, given the
disruption it causes defense production—but rather as a means of
ensuring U.S. access to specialty metals in a time of war. As an
extension of that “supply chain” rationale, Congress created a new
board that will assess the strategic imperatives for the specialty metals
ban. Congress’ new emphasis on sheltering a strategic supply chain,
rather than simply protecting U.S. industry, arguably set a new tone in
domestic preferences, one that may shape future policy debates. Unfor-
tunately, the legislation also left a number of questions unanswered.
On December 6, 2006, Shay Assad, Director of Defense Procurement
31. See generally Chierichella & Gallacher, supra note 20.
32. 10 U.S.C. § 2533(b) (2006).
33. See Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), 48 C.F.R. § 252.225-
7014 (2007).
34. See generally Yukins, supra note 20.
35. See, e.g., Chierichella & Gallacher, supra note 20.
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and Acquisition Policy, issued guidance to implement the new legisla-
tion. This guidance, issued in the form of a class deviation36 to existing
regulations,37 will remain in place until rescinded or supplanted by a
revised regulation.38 The new guidance resolves several ambiguities in
the recent defense authorization act, though it is almost certainly not
the last word on this topic.
3. Tiering: Enhanced Complexity Rather Than Optimal Policy?
The December 6, 2006 class deviation created a curious “tiering” of
specialty metals compliance, which seems to borrow loosely from other
domestic-content regimes. It is reminiscent of the Federal Transit
Administration’s “Buy American” regulations, for example, which re-
quire that all manufactured products used in federally funded projects
be manufactured in the United States, and that all components of those
manufactured products—but not necessarily all subcomponents—also
be of U.S. origin.39 The tiers would apply to contracts in six key
categories of contracts: (1) aircraft, (2) missile and space systems, (3)
ships, (4) tank and automotive items, (5) weapon systems, and (6)
ammunition.40 The new “tiering” prescription, taken in conjunction
with the Alternate I version of a new Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement (DFARS) clause,41 to be used in the six key
36. “Class deviations affect more than one contract action. When an agency knows that it will
require a class deviation on a permanent basis, it should propose a FAR revision, if appropriate.
Civilian agencies, other than NASA, must furnish a copy of each approved class deviation to the
FAR Secretariat.” FAR 1.404, 48 C.F.R. § 1.404 (2007).
37. See Memorandum from Shay D. Assad, Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition
Policy to Commander, U.S. Special Operations, re: DAR Tracking No. 2006-O0004 (Dec. 6, 2006),
available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/2006-2051-DPAP.pdf.
38. See, e.g., David M. Nadler, Harvey G. Sherzer & Michael C. Mateer, Feature Comment,
New Department of Defense Berry Amendment Guidance—Some Answers and More Questions, 48 GOV’T
CONTRACTOR ¶ 435 (2006).
39. See 49 C.F.R. § 661.5(d)(2) (2007).
40. These six categories date back at least to the early 1970s, when then-Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird focused Berry Amendment specialty metals enforcement on these categories
because they encompass most of the specialty metals purchased by the Defense Department.
41. DFARS 252.225-7014, 48 C.F.R. § 252.225-7014 (deviation). As is noted further below, the
controversy over specialty metals is likely to continue for some time. The Defense Department’s
December 2006 action was followed by Defense Department “non-availability” determinations
that there were not adequate domestic sources of specialty metals for circuit cards and fasteners;
those determinations are available at http://guidebook.dcma.mil/225/instructions.htm (“can-
cel” password). The House Armed Services Committee responded in May 2007 with a number of
provisions which seemed specifically intended to constrain the use of foreign specialty metals. See
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 1585, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (as
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
542 [Vol. 38
categories of contracts, mean that the Berry Amendment specialty
metals ban will extend only to:
● End products, i.e., supplies delivered under a line item of a
contract;
● “First-tier components,” defined as “first-tier parts and assemblies
that are incorporated directly into the end product”; and
● “Second-tier components,” in turn defined as parts and assemblies
“that are incorporated directly into a first-tier component.”
The Defense Department’s “tiering” approach also follows the con-
ceptual structure of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which
defines “end products” (“articles, materials, and supplies to be ac-
quired for public use”) and “components” (“an article, material, or
supply incorporated directly into an end product”)42—though the FAR
definition does not seem to contemplate “second-tier” components.
The “tiering” approach adopted by the Defense Department may
reflect a practical concern that haunts the Berry Amendment specialty
metals requirements: the concern, for example, that a small bolt
containing Russian titanium, if installed in an otherwise compliant
fighter jet, could disrupt delivery of that aircraft. By applying the Berry
Amendment ban only to “end products” and “first- and second-tier”
components, the Defense Department’s latest guidance avoids that
practical concern because the small “noncompliant” bolt in our ex-
ample presumably would not fall into any of those categories.
Even this simple example of the Russian titanium bolt, however,
exposes how hard the Defense Department strained to accommodate
dueling demands—legislative protectionism and a global supply chain.
The example suggests that the compromise drawn by the Defense
Department ultimately may not be sustainable. How is one to deter-
mine whether the hypothetical “noncompliant” bolt is a “first-tier” or
“second-tier” component? Unlike an “end product,” which one as-
sumes would be listed in a contractual schedule of items to be deliv-
ered, assigning “tiers” to components is a hugely subjective exercise.
reported out of the House Armed Services Committee, May 11, 2007), at § 809 (which would
“clarify” requirements relating to specialty metals), § 845 (which would “level” the competitive
advantage enjoyed by certain foreign users of specialty metals), and § 846 (which would call for
formal rulemaking before the DoD exempted contracts from specialty metals requirements on a
class basis). The Bush administration threatened to veto the legislation if it passed with these
domestic preferences in place. See Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 1585—National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, at 1 (May 16, 2007), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-1/hr1585sap-h.pdf.
42. 48 C.F.R. § 25.003 (2007).
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The examples provided with the December 2006 class deviation
indicate that “tiers” do not correspond to levels of prime- and sub-
contractors; thus, per the example provided by the Defense Depart-
ment, a prime contractor may contract for and deliver to the govern-
ment a “first-tier component.” The examples suggest that first- and
second-tier components are instead defined functionally, rather than by
the level of contractor (or subcontractor) supplying the item. The
Defense Department guidance states that a first-tier component (a
rocket motor, in the example) is incorporated directly into an end
product (the rocket), and a second-tier component (a power supply for
the rocket motor, in the example) is incorporated directly into a
first-tier component. This “functional” approach makes a great deal of
sense, for if the Defense Department had taken a “contractor-tier”
approach—if, for example, materials from “third-tier” subcontractors
automatically qualified as “third-tier” components (and thus fell out-
side the Berry Amendment ban)—prime contractors would simply
fragment the supply chain into many more contractual layers in order
to avoid Berry Amendment compliance costs.
On its face, this “functional” approach also seems simple to imple-
ment: it merely means identifying “end products” to be delivered
under a contract, and then, like unpacking Russian matryoshka dolls,
determining which “tier” of component may include noncompliant
specialty metals. Under the Defense Department class deviation, only
the first and second tiers of components will be relevant.
In fact, however, the Defense Department’s “tiering” approach leaves
a great deal of uncertainty. In a highly complex weapon system, it is
often very difficult to determine at what “tier” a specific item falls. Is a
“tier” an aircraft door or the aircraft’s entire fuselage, for example?
This uncertainty will generate substantial costs and inefficiencies as
contractors and suppliers haggle over the metaphysics of “tiers” in
order to allocate the risks and costs of Berry Amendment compliance.
At the same time, however, the uncertainty in interpretation will
leave the Defense Department and its contractors significant flexibility
in interpreting the Berry Amendment’s specialty metals ban—flexibil-
ity that ultimately may allow for narrow interpretations of the ban. The
confusion over defining “tiers” of components also means that it will be
difficult to punish noncompliance as fraud, a threat which normally
cows contractors into strict compliance in the U.S. system. In the end,
the Defense Department’s decision to inject flexibility into Berry
Amendment compliance reflects the internal fissures that undermine
traditional domestic preferences: agencies and contractors, under
pressure to draw on a global supply chain, are resisting political
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demands to accommodate domestic industries.
B. Secondary, Non-Economic Objectives As Barriers: Assessing Accessibility
Requirements in Information Technology
The next category of rules-based barriers is secondary objectives of a
non-economic nature. As Arrowsmith describes them, “[s]econdary
policies (or, in United States terminology, ‘collateral’ policies) are
those that do not relate to the main object of the procurement . . . for
example, a policy of placing government contracts with disadvantaged
ethnic groups to promote racial equality.”43 These “secondary” or
“collateral” policies, which typically are used to identify favored contrac-
tors, or weigh in the decision to award a contract, can erect substantial
barriers to entry to a procurement market. Intentionally or not, these
collateral policies may discriminate in favor of domestic industry.
Furthermore, when integrated into a complex procurement process,
collateral policies almost invariably increase contracting officials’ discre-
tion, and thus diminish transparency and increase the threat of corrup-
tion.44
One intriguing example in this sphere is the collateral (or “second-
ary”) procurement policy of requiring that government agencies gener-
ally purchase only information technology that is accessible to persons
with disabilities. This requirement, now enshrined in U.S. federal
procurement rules,45 proves particularly relevant because the Euro-
pean Union is considering a similar accessibility requirement for
43. ARROWSMITH, supra note 13, at 15, 325-26.
44. Id. at 327; see also Schooner, supra note 18.
It is axiomatic that government spending can influence behaviour and infuse growth in
communities and economic sectors. Conversely, efforts to redistribute wealth through
the procurement system, by their very nature, restrict competition. . .. [A]s various
constituencies or special interest groups compete for their perceived “fair share of the
pie,” others are left wanting.
Schooner, supra note 18, at 108-9.
45. See generally John J. Pavlick & Rebecca Pearson, Implementing the New 508 Accessibility
Standards for the Disabled, 36 PROCUREMENT LAW. 1 (Spring 2001); Aaron P. Silberman, Recent
Developments in Section 508 Disabled Access Requirements for IT Procurements, 40 PROCUREMENT LAW. 19
(Spring 2005); Sheila C. Stark, Feature Comment, The FAR Rule on EIT Accessibility Under Section
508—Nine Months Later, 44 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 149 (2002); Christopher R. Yukins, Making
Federal Information Technology Accessible: A Case Study in Social Policy and Procurement, 33 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 667 (2004).
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procurements in its member states.46
As in the United States, the goal of the European effort is to leverage
government procurement to increase accessibility across the informa-
tion technology marketplace, both inside and outside government.47
The European “eAccessibility” initiative, like the accessibility initiative
in the U.S. procurement system, is thus a typical “collateral” policy
imported into the procurement system: a social goal carried out
through the procurement process, but not directly related to the
procurement system’s core mission. Although the European initiative
is several years behind the United States’ effort, there is every indica-
tion that the European Union will follow much the same path, and
promulgate technical standards for accessibility that European agen-
cies will have to follow in purchasing information technology and
communications equipment. The U.S. experience is therefore impor-
tant in predicting the trade impact that a matching regime might have
in Europe.
In principle, the U.S. accessibility requirements could have proven
terribly discriminatory against foreign suppliers. Unlike the European
initiative, which seeks to build on harmonized international accessibil-
ity standards,48 the U.S. accessibility standards-writers did not simply
rely on industry standards, but in many instances crafted their own
specific standards under Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act.49 For-
eign vendors thus faced a real risk that their electronics and informa-
tion technology products, not developed in accordance with the unique
U.S. standards under Section 508, would be excluded from the U.S.
46. See Press Release, European Commission, How Information and Communications Tech-
nologies Can Be Made More Accessible for EU Citizens: Frequently Asked Questions, EC
MEMO/05/320 (Sept. 15, 2005); Communication from the Commission to the Council, eAccessibility, at
9-10, COM (2005) 425 final (Sept. 13, 2005), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
site/en/com/2005/com2005_0425en01.pdf.
47. See, e.g., European Commission Standardisation Mandate to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI in
Support of European Accessibility Requirements for Public Procurement of Products and Services in the ICT
Domain, at 2, EC Mandate M376 (Dec. 7, 2005) (“The inclusion of accessibility requirements in
public procurement will constitute an incentive for manufacturers to develop and to offer
accessible devices, applications and services, which in turn will benefit people with disabilities and
older people but also will be to the benefit of other users.”), available at http://europa.eu.int/
information_society/policy/accessibility/deploy/pubproc/eso-m376/a_documents/
m376%20en.pdf.
48. See European Commission, eAccessibility, supra note 46, at 10 (European Commission
seeks to work with United States and other international partners “on harmonisation of eAccessi-
bility requirements for public procurement”); European Commission, EC Mandate M376, supra
note 47 (European standards for accessibility will look to international standards).
49. See 65 Fed. Reg. 80500, 80510 (Dec. 21, 2001) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 1194).
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procurement market.
In practice, however, the U.S. accessibility standards proved less
restrictive than expected for both domestic and foreign vendors. The
U.S. accessibility standards were overtaken by changes in technology
and hampered by their incompatibility with emerging international
standards.50 The accessibility standards left numerous loopholes for
agencies and vendors,51 and in implementing the standards in procure-
ment, agencies have not been aggressive in forcing accessibility.52
Vendors, for their part, have proven reluctant to challenge agencies or
competitors on accessibility through bid protests or otherwise.
The agencies’ slow implementation of accessibility requirements
may be due to the sheer complexity of the standards, but is also likely
due, in part, to agencies’ resistance to “collateral” policies that distract
from the agencies’ core missions.53 For many of the same reasons that
agencies resist traditional domestic preferences such as the Berry
Amendment’s specialty metals ban—agencies’ reluctance to incur addi-
tional costs, suffer delay, or lose focus in procuring best value—
agencies are likely to resist collateral (or “secondary”) policies in
procurement. This is not, of course, to argue that collateral policies are
not important in procurement, or to suggest that they will not work, in
practice, to discriminate against foreign suppliers, which are generally
less familiar with how those policies are implemented in procurement
systems. The point instead is that the protectionist impact of these
discriminatory collateral policies—and the impulse to accommodate
them in the first place—will likely be muted by agencies’ stubborn
reluctance to implement preferences and policies that are not, at
bottom, the agencies’ own.
C. “Illegitimate Practices” as a Barrier to Entry: The Boeing-Druyun Debacle
The third category of barriers to procurement markets stems from
“illegitimate practices.” This category, Arrowsmith argues, “consists of
corruption, nepotism and patronage (the use of procurement to
50. See Wade-Hahn Chan, Advisory Committee Faces Major Hurdles with Section 508 Revision, FED.
COMPUTER WK., Nov. 15, 2006, available at http://www.fcw.com/article96831-11-15-06-Web.
51. See, e.g., Yukins, supra note 45, at 704-8.
52. See, e.g., Randall Edwards, Fed Sites Lack Accessibility, FED. COMPUTER WK., Oct. 21, 2003,
available at http://www.fcw.com/article81271-10-21-03-Web; William Matthews, One Year and
Counting: Section 508, FED. COMPUTER WK., June 24, 2002, available at http://www.fcw.com/
article77009.
53. See Margaret A.T. Reed, Agencies Still on the Learning Curve, FED. COMPUTER WK., Aug. 11,
2003, available at http://www.fcw.com/article80520-08-11-03-Print.
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reward political supporters).” Most of these practices are patently
illegal and unethical, which sets them apart from the generally legal
discriminatory practices discussed above, such as traditional domestic-
content requirements and “collateral” socioeconomic policies. Corrup-
tion, in contrast, is clearly illegal. Patronage, however, makes a harder
case; Arrowsmith points out “in the case of patronage the line between
the legitimate and the illegitimate uses of procurement may be difficult
to draw and is different in different national systems.”54
The corruption of Darleen Druyun, a senior U.S. Air Force procure-
ment official, captured the attention of the U.S. procurement commu-
nity55 and prominently illustrated discriminatory illegitimate prac-
tices.56 Ms. Druyun was the senior civilian procurement official in the
Air Force, and had accumulated extraordinary powers over the decades
she spent in its procurement system.57 As part of a broader investiga-
tion into an Air Force procurement involving a potential lease of
refueling tankers—driven, in part, by Senator John McCain’s (R-AZ)
concern for apparent waste in the procurement—it emerged that Ms.
Druyun had negotiated her later employment with the Boeing Com-
54. ARROWSMITH, supra note 13, at 16.
55. See, e.g., Jeffrey Branstetter, Darleen Druyun: An Evolving Case Study in Corruption, Power, and
Procurement, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 443 (2005); see, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp., Comp. Gen. B-295402,
2005 Comp. Gen. Proc. Dec. ¶ 24 (Feb. 18, 2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress162.140.64.21&filename295402.pdf&directory/diskb/wais/data/
gao_comptroller_general.
56. Sadly, the Druyun scandal proved a mere harbinger for, among others, Representative
Randy “Duke” Cunningham, who:
demanded, sought, and received at least $2.4 million in illicit payments and benefits . . .
including cash, checks, meals, travel, lodging, furnishings, antiques, rugs, yacht club
fees, boat repairs and improvements, moving expenses, cars, and boats; . . . used his
public office and took other official action to pressure and influence [DoD] personnel
to award and execute government contracts in a manner that would benefit [his
coconspirators] . . . because of his receipt of the above-described payments and
benefits, and not because using [these firms] was in the best interest of the country[.]
Plea Agreement for Defendant Randall Harold Cunningham, United States v. Cunningham, Crim.
No. 05cr2137-LAB (S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2005), available at http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/crim/
uscnnghm112805plea.pdf. Even before it became clear that the sensational Cunningham allega-
tions were true, it was apparent that a strong message regarding the importance of integrity was
not emanating from the highest levels of government. See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner, Viewpoint,
Procurement Proper, 37 GOV’T EXEC. 70 (Aug. 15, 2005), http://www.govexec.com/features/0805-
15/0805-15advp.htm.
57. See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, The Scandal of the Pentagon’s “Dragon Lady,” INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct.
9, 2004, at 16.
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pany at the same time she was negotiating with Boeing on the tanker
procurement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 208. She pleaded guilty and
served nine months in federal prison. Boeing ultimately paid a record
fine of $615 million to resolve various allegations stemming from
procurement improprieties, including its dealings with Ms. Druyun.58
For our purposes here, the Druyun case is interesting because she
improperly and corruptly favored Boeing, a domestic supplier, over a
foreign supplier, European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company
(EADS).59 But it was not discrimination against a foreign supplier that
landed Ms. Druyun in prison. Rather, it was the corruption, her personal
self-dealing, that triggered the discrimination and landed Ms. Druyun in
jail. Indeed, any discriminatory favoritism Ms. Druyun afforded Boeing
would have been against a backdrop of fervent domestic support for
Boeing, a leading U.S. manufacturer.60 What the Druyun case illus-
trates is that an anti-corruption legal regime—even one as strong and
mature as that of the United States’—can attack only corruption, and
can do little (if anything) to dissipate anti-foreign discrimination that
can, in effect, block access to a procurement market.61 The good news,
58. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Boeing to Pay United States Record $615
Million to Resolve Fraud Allegations (June 30, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/June/
06_civ_412.html; Tony Capaccio & Robert Schmidt, Boeing to Pay Record Settlement, S. FLA.
SUN-SENTINEL, July 1, 2006, at 14B.
59. See Supplemental Statement of Facts, United States v. Druyun, Crim. No. 04-150-A, at 2-3
(E.D. Va. 2004), available at http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/druyunpostpleaadmission.pdf. Accord-
ing to this document,
In negotiations with Boeing concerning the lease agreement for 100 Boeing KC 767A
tanker aircraft, the defendant agreed to a higher price for the aircraft than she believed
was appropriate. The defendant did so, in her view, as a “parting gift to Boeing” and
because of her desire to ingratiate herself with Boeing, her future employer. The
defendant also now acknowledges providing to Boeing during the negotiations what at
the time she considered to be proprietary pricing data supplied by another aircraft
manufacturer [presumably EADS].
Id.; George Cahlink, Ex-Pentagon Procurement Executive Gets Jail Time, GOV’T EXEC., Oct. 1, 2004,
available at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1004/100104g1.htm.
60. See James Wallace, Tanker Wars: Boeing Challenged, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 1,
2006, at A1, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/272243_tankers01.html.
61. European aerospace executives and trade proponents must have been troubled, for
example, when Senator John McCain released a number of e-mails related to the Boeing
tanker-lease deal, including this April 16, 2003 exchange. Michael W. Wynne, then-Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, wrote: “They [Airbus] came in a couple of weeks ago and
offered to build the majority [of the tankers] here in America . . . . I am not sure where this will
lead, but the benefits of competition may be revealing.” The Secretary of the Air Force, John
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however, is that an effective anti-corruption regime, such as that in the
United States,62 can help tamp down discrimination (and thus help
open a domestic procurement market) by deterring corruption that
would otherwise fuel the fires of discrimination; that, in turn, can yield
substantial welfare benefits for the purchasing nation.63
D. Restrictions Directed to Agencies’ Procurement Objectives: Framework
Agreements and Interagency Contracting
The fourth category of barriers stems from measures “concerned
with the ‘commercial’ aspects of procurement. . .and an efficient pro-
curement process.” Arrowsmith cautions that these measures, while
ostensibly intended only to improve the procurement system, may, in
practice, have deep discriminatory effects.64
In the U.S. procurement market, the best current example of this
type of indirect barrier is framework contracting.65 In the U.S. federal
arena, framework agreements are known as “indefinite delivery/
indefinite quantity” (IDIQ) contracts, “government-wide acquisition
contracts” (GWACs), or “Multiple Award Schedules” (MAS) contracts,
depending on the agency or context in which they arise. For purposes
of common understanding, however, this Article uses the more descrip-
tive European term, “framework agreements.”66
Roche, replied: “Mike, you must be out of your mind!!! . . . We won’t be happy with your doing
this!” 150 CONG. REC. S11776, S11780 (Nov. 20, 2004). This is an important reminder that, as at
least one post-scandal review panel concluded, procurement rules alone are insufficient; leader-
ship plays a critical role in implementing policy. See generally DEF. SCI. BD., REPORT OF THE DEFENSE
SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT IN ACQUISITION ORGANIZATIONS (March
2005), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2005-03-MOAO_Report_Final.pdf.
62. This is not to suggest that the current oversight regime in the United States is fully
effective. Failure to invest in appropriate personnel to staff the U.S. procurement regime has led
to an increasingly distressing string of scandals and failures that, we expect, will result in
congressional action (and potential over-reaction) for the foreseeable future. See generally Steven
L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Out-
sourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549, 550 n.3, 557-61 (2005).
63. See, e.g., Simon J. Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman, Government Procurement: Market Access,
Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules 18-19 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No.
3195, Jan. 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract342380 (analyzing theoretical economic
impact of gains in transparency).
64. See ARROWSMITH, supra note 13, at 17-18.
65. This review of framework contracting draws on discussion papers presented by Christo-
pher Yukins at The George Washington University Law School (Sept. 2005) and at the conference
of the Federal Circuit Bar Association (Washington, D.C., May 2006).
66. See, e.g., Sue Arrowsmith, The Past and Future Evolution of EC Procurement Law: From
Framework to Common Code, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 337, 348-49, 362 (2006) (discussing regulation of
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Under framework contracting, a procuring agency (often a central-
ized purchasing agency) generally will compete and award multiple
standing contracts, or “framework” agreements. To win those con-
tracts, vendors typically propose unit prices for specific goods or
services; at the time of award, however, there is no certainty as to the
actual number of items or hours that will be ordered.
As requirements arise, a customer agency—which may not be the
agency that actually holds the contract, for that may be a centralized
purchasing agency—will actually issue a task or delivery order against a
standing contract. That order may be competed among the various
holders of the standing contracts; the extent of competition varies
enormously, depending on the applicable rules and agency proce-
dures. There may be no effective competition at all (the worst-case
scenario). Further, there may be little to no transparency to the order:
in many cases, the requirement is never announced, the competition
(if any) is held privately among the standing contract holders, and the
order is issued with no public disclosure.
In theory, these types of contracts should provide more competition
because framework agreements, as noted, are presumptively awarded to
multiple suppliers at initial award, and U.S. regulations require that,
after initial award, each of these multiple suppliers must be afforded a
“fair opportunity” to compete for subsequent orders awarded under
the framework agreements. In practice, however, too often suppliers
are denied that fair opportunity to compete, even if they hold standing
contracts.67
Agencies can avoid competition—and thus deny suppliers the “fair
opportunity to compete”—by abusing certain exceptions authorized
by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Furthermore, the Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO) has found that even if multiple-
award contractors are theoretically given a fair opportunity to compete,
practical considerations often make it impossible for non-incumbent
contractors to respond in time to be eligible for award.68
framework agreement under new European procurement directives); Sue Arrowsmith, Framework
Purchasing and Qualification Lists under the European Procurement Directives (Parts I & II), 8 PUB. PROC.
L. REV. 115, 161, 168 (1999).
67. See, e.g., Thomas F. Burke & Stanley C. Dees, Feature Comment, The Impact of Multiple-
Award Contracts on the Underlying Values of the Federal Procurement System, 44 GOV. CONTRACTOR ¶ 431
(Nov. 6, 2002) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., MULTIPLE AWARD CONTRACTS
FOR SERVICES, REPORT NO. D-2001-189 (Sept. 30, 2001) [hereinafter MULTIPLE AWARD CONTRACTS]).
68. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO/NSIAD-00-56, FEW COMPETING
PROPOSALS FOR LARGE DOD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ORDERS 10 (Mar. 2000), available at
http://www.gao.gov (search “Keyword or Report #” for “NSIAD-00-56”).
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Collusion, or at least calculation, seems to play a part in this loss of
competition. A report from the Defense Department’s Inspector Gen-
eral showed that multiple-award framework agreements had been used
on at least one occasion to create an illusion of competition, when in
reality the customer agency had already selected a preferred contractor
or knew that two contractors had agreed not to compete against each
other. The audit report revealed that two-thirds of the contracting
organizations reviewed “awarded task orders on a directed-source basis
because the program offices preferred to work with a specific contrac-
tor.”69
A number of reports have suggested why agency officials collude to
reduce competition under task-order contracts. Centralized purchas-
ing agencies, which establish the framework agreements in the first
instance, will feel pressure to accommodate customer agencies by
allowing tasks to be awarded to those customer agencies’ favored
contractors. To ease award to a favored contractor—often the incum-
bent contractor—the contracting agency may (1) fail to notify other
vendors (other framework agreement holders) of an available task, (2)
provide inadequate notice, (3) fail to provide useful specifications, (4)
impose biased technical requirements, (5) allow a slanted evaluation of
offers, (6) inadequately assess the reasonableness of the favored ven-
dor’s proffered price,70 or (7) ignore the many other rules meant to
ensure vigorous, transparent competition.71
These failures in competition are compounded, and shrouded, by a
lack of transparency and accountability. As an example, although
traditionally all federal business opportunities over $25,000 had to be
advertised,72 neither requirements nor awards under U.S. framework
agreements must be published.73
Indeed, even the existence of task-order contracts is not currently
published. Although FAR Subpart 5.6 requires publication of a list of
69. MULTIPLE AWARD CONTRACTS, supra note 67, at 10.
70. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-05-229, OPPORTUNITIES TO
IMPROVE PRICING OF GSA MULTIPLE AWARD SCHEDULES CONTRACTS 15-16 (Feb. 2005) (criticizing
drop in effective pre-award audits); see also Patience Wait, GSA Urged to Resume Post-Award Audits of
Vendors, WASH. TECH., July 29, 2005, available at http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/1_1/
daily_news/26666-1.html (discussing congressional criticism of failure to hold pre- and post-
award audits on GSA contracts).
71. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 70, at 15-16; see also Wait, supra
note 70.
72. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. §§ 5.101, 5.203 (2007).
73. See, e.g., FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 16.505(a)(1) (2007) (a “contracting officer does not synopsize
orders under indefinite-delivery contracts”).
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interagency framework agreements, as of February 1, 2006 that list,
which is to be published at www.contractdirectory.gov, had been dis-
abled. Customer agencies instead must rely on vendors and centralized
purchasing agencies to search out these contracting vehicles in an
all-too-invisible marketplace that relies on relationships more than on
competition, and which raises obvious dangers of corruption.74 Nor are
there effective institutional checks on this marketplace of relationships,
for many orders under task-order contracts are exempt from protest.75
These failures in transparency and competition have prompted
many calls for reform of task-order contracts,76 and Congress and the
agencies have responded with a number of incremental efforts at
reform.77 The Acquisition Advisory Panel, a blue-ribbon panel launched
in 2003, recently issued a nearly 500-page draft report, much of which
focused on problems (and possible solutions) regarding these types of
contracts.78 Despite these efforts, however, the core problems with
task-order contracting in the United States—minimal transparency,
diluted competition, and inadequate review—remain unresolved.
The framework agreements and their associated problems are not
unique to the United States. As the discussion above notes, in the
federal system in the United States, orders under a master framework
agreement need not be publicized for competition or award. Similarly,
under the recent European Union procurement directives, once a
framework agreement is in place, the “mini-competitions” between
multiple awardees for the follow-on contracts need not be publicized.79
Guidance published by the U.K. Office of Government Commerce
74. See Christopher R. Yukins, Ethics in Procurement: New Challenges After a Decade of Reform, 38
PROCUREMENT LAW. 3 (2003).
75. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 16.505(a)(6) (2007).
76. See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner, Feature Comment, Risky Business: Managing Interagency
Acquisition, 47 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 156 (2005) (applauding the GAO for adding the manage-
ment of interagency contracting to its “high risk” list and suggesting that interagency acquisition
has evolved from “the poster child for the flexible, streamlined, businesslike approach of the
1990’s acquisition reform movement” into the federal procurement system’s “Achilles heel”).
77. See, e.g., 70 Fed. Reg. 43,578 (July 27, 2005) (noting that the rule would require special
justification if fewer than three master agreement holders will be solicited for opportunity under
the GSA schedule contracts).
78. See AAP DRAFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 3 (30-44).
79. See, e.g., EUR. DEV. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., PROCUREMENT POLICIES AND RULES 8
(2000), available at http://www.ebrd.com/about/policies/procure/ppr.pdf; see also EBRD—
Policies, http://www.ebrd.com/about/policies/procure/index.htm (“The EBRD’s Procurement
Policies and Rules are based on the fundamental principles of non-discrimination, fairness and
transparency. They are designed to promote efficiency and effectiveness and to minimise credit
risk in the implementation of the Bank’s lending and investment operations.”).
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indicates that, if the original agreement is publicized in the Official
Journal of the European Communities, subsequent contracts competed
under that agreement need not be advertised.80 Unlike the U.S. system,
the European directive contemplates an initial “framework agreement”
and then a series of “contracts,” to be issued under the framework
agreement.81
There are subtle distinctions in terminology, but not necessarily in
substance, between the U.S. and European rules systems.82 As in the
United States, requirements need only be competed among the stand-
ing awardees under the EU framework agreements.83 Indeed, under
the EU system there may be even less competition. While U.S. rules on
competition contemplate affording all the master contract holders a
“fair opportunity to compete” for individual orders,84 the EU directive
countenances award of an order (a “contract”) without further compe-
tition among the standing framework contractors, if it is possible to
make an award per the terms already “laid down in the [original]
framework agreement.”85
All of the problems presented by framework contracting—the loss of
transparency and competition, and the profound incentives (and
opportunities) for favoritism and corruption—raise serious potential
barriers to foreign vendors. As a threshold matter, a foreign vendor
80. See U.K. Office of Gov’t Commerce, Framework Agreements and EC Developments ¶ 9 (2004),
available at http://www/ogc.gov/documents/Framework_Agreements_and_EC_Developments.doc
(“It is far better, therefore, to advertise the framework itself, so that there is no need to consider
the need for advertising as each call-off comes up.”); cf. FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 16.505(b)(4) (record
required only in contract file). See generally Sue Arrowsmith, Framework Agreements under the UK
Procurement Regulations: Denfleet v. NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency, 14 PUB. PROC. L. REV. NA86
(2005); Arrowsmith, Framework Purchasing, supra note 66, at 123 (attributing an increasing use of
electronic media and electronic ordering to the increased importance of framework agreements).
81. See Council Directive 2004/18, On the Coordination of Procedures for the Award of
Public Works Contracts, Public Supply Contracts and Public Service Contracts, art. 32, 2004 O.J.
(L 134) 114 [hereinafter Public Works Directive], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uriCELEX:32004L0018:EN:NOT. See generally Steven L. Schoo-
ner & Christopher R. Yukins, Emerging Policy and Practice Issues, a paper presented at the
West-Thomson Government Contracts Year in Review Conference in February, 2005, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id663464.
82. In the United States’ federal system, as noted, the initial award is for a competitive
“contract,” but then task and delivery orders—not contracts—are issued against that master
contract. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. §§ 16.501, 16.505 (2007). Thus, there is a subtle difference in
nomenclature: U.S. agencies issue “task orders” under a master contract, while European agencies
will issue “contracts” under a master framework agreement.
83. See Public Works Directive, supra note 81, art. 12.
84. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 16.505(b)(1) (2007).
85. See Public Works Directive, supra note 81, art. 32, ¶ 4.
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new to the market must learn of the framework agreements’ impor-
tance. Because opportunities and awards under framework agreements
are not publicized, however, it is difficult for any newcomer to discern
their importance. Notably, even seasoned U.S. observers were sur-
prised when the Acquisition Advisory Panel, an independent commis-
sion, reported that fully forty percent of the nearly-$400 billion U.S.
procurement market are handled through interagency framework
agreements.86
Once a foreign vendor does finally appreciate the importance of
framework agreements, the vendor faces a practical problem of actually
joining one. Most framework arrangements in the United States are
“closed” once the initial contracts are awarded, typically for terms of up
to five to ten years. An exception is the General Services Administra-
tion’s Multiple Award Schedules (MAS) contracts, which are always
“open”: a vendor willing to submit to the three- to six-month negotia-
tion process may always submit an offer to join the MAS contracts.
There is no true “competition,” in the strictest sense, to join the GSA
MAS arrangement; instead, the vendor must disclose its commercial
pricing, and generally must commit to keep its MAS prices at a level
below its commercial prices over the term of the MAS contract, which
may be extended up to twenty years (through five-year options). As a
result of this “open” approach, literally thousands of vendors have
joined the GSA MAS system.
The “open” system used by the GSA MAS contracts eliminates one
barrier to entry for foreign vendors—the problem of arriving too late,
after the standing agreements are in place—but raises other, far less
obvious barriers to the naı¨ve foreign vendor. Over decades of practice,
the MAS negotiation process has evolved into an arcane and highly
sophisticated art form. Because the MAS vehicle is always “open,” and
there is no real competition between vendors to join, a vendor’s commer-
cial pricing is the key benchmark for the vendor’s MAS pricing. As a
result, in negotiating prices under MAS contracts, vendors must struggle
artfully to distinguish their commercial discounts, both before and
after award. Otherwise, low commercial prices may “choke” the prices
allowed under the MAS contract; at the same time, vendors must be
concerned that the MAS pricing structure (in essence, a “most favored
nation” pricing structure) will restrict their ability to lower their
commercial prices. In sum, therefore, the arcane rules of pricing under
the GSA MAS contracts raise their own, maddening barrier to foreign
86. See AAP DRAFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
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vendors that seek to enter the U.S. market.
Even if a foreign vendor has discovered framework contracting, has
identified a viable framework arrangement to join, and has passed
through the contracting process, the vendor must still survive in the
brutal and shadowy world of “call-off” competitions. As noted, agencies
are not required to publicize opportunities to be let through standing
contracts. Depending on the applicable rules and circumstances, the
customer agencies may solicit competition from those that hold stand-
ing framework agreements; in some cases, however, the agency may
not. When the competition for an order is held, the agency may keep
its stated criteria for award to a breezy minimum, and, because debrief-
ings and protests often are not required, the agency’s discretionary
award decision may be completely immune from challenge or review.
To add insult to injury, the data on the award may be spotty, and the
terms used—because the standing contracts are generically crafted
with little particularity—may well favor a savvy, incumbent contractor.
In both principle and practice, therefore, framework agreements
pose a very real barrier to international trade.87 More broadly, they
show how pernicious these types of rules-based barriers can be: where
agencies are enticed by “efficiency” (or other gains), customer agencies
(and their central purchasing cohorts) may well embrace a procure-
ment device that is, in practice, grotesquely discriminatory. The agen-
cies will not, in this instance, serve as a counterweight to discrimination.
Unlike other categories of barriers to procurement across borders—
classic domestic-content requirements, collateral socioeconomic re-
quirements, or illegitimate practices—here there is no institutional
resistance to the barrier: the government agencies, normally natural
proponents of reducing barriers, will instead foster the barriers in their
eagerness to grasp some other institutional goal, such as efficiency. For
these types of barriers, therefore, the pressure for reform—and for
reducing the barriers to trade—probably must come from outside the
procurement system’s own institutions.
III. INSTRUMENTS TO OPEN THE INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT MARKET
Having described the potential of an open international procure-
ment market, and the obstacles to achieving it, we turn now to the
various types of instruments that might be used to open that market.
Public procurement policymakers might recoil at the menu we offer to
87. Cf. ARROWSMITH, supra note 13, at 271-75 (discussing framework purchasing under the
GPA).
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the extent that none of these vehicles is a typical tool used to effectuate
public procurement policy. For example, in the United States, procure-
ment policy and practice are, inter alia, framed by legislation both
authorizing action and appropriating money to pursue objectives,
implemented by regulation, clarified and embellished upon in policy
documents, interpreted through adjudicatory actions (e.g., bid pro-
tests, contract disputes, and criminal indictments and prosecutions,
some of which produce publicly available precedential opinions), and
commented upon by scholars and practitioners in books, journal
articles, and in the trade press. But experience suggests that in the
United States, as in other nations, procurement policy and law tend to
be grudgingly reconciled with, rather than driven by, norm-creating
global procurement instruments.
For our purposes here, there are at least three basic types of
instruments that may help liberalize international procurement mar-
kets:
● Model procurement codes, or model statements of principle or best practices,
that discourage discrimination, either explicitly or by discouraging
indirect barriers to trade. The United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Procure-
ment of Goods, Construction and Services falls within this cat-
egory. Less obvious models include the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) procurement assessment
tool, and the “Integrity Pacts” fostered by Transparency Interna-
tional.
● Procurement guidelines imposed by central financial institutions. Procure-
ment guidelines issued by the World Bank or the regional develop-
ment banks are examples of this category.
● Binding international agreements or directives that require nondiscrimina-
tion, both explicitly and implicitly by barring various recognized
indirect barriers to international procurement. These include, of
course, the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s Government Pro-
curement Agreement.
We will address each of these only briefly, with due regard for the
extensive literature already available regarding many of these instru-
ments. Of course, our list is not exhaustive. In his 2005 essay, The Global
Procurement Harmonisation Initiative,88 Attila Kovacs canvassed many of
these instruments in his effort to chart a path forward for harmoniza-
88. Attila Kovacs, The Global Procurement Harmonisation Initiative, 14 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 15
(2005).
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tion of procurement codes worldwide. Frankly, Kovacs’ vision is far
more ambitious than ours. Where he aspires to a form of global
uniformity, through thoroughly harmonized global procurement codes,
we do not share his optimism.89 Rather, we merely seek to identify an
instrument or instruments that could be used, much like a constitution,
to shape individual nations’ procurement codes in a common fashion
in order to open markets and reduce discrimination. In the end,
Kovacs is right to press for more thorough harmonization, because
dissonance between countries’ procurement codes is inefficient and
poses barriers to entry. Arrowsmith calls these inefficiencies “structural
restrictions,” which raise practical barriers to entry as foreign vendors
run headlong into dense and alien procurement regimes.90 As a
practical and political matter, however, we sense that any semblance of
true procurement code harmonization is at least a generation away. For
now, therefore, progress will stem from instruments that impose com-
mon norms on hugely disparate procurement regimes.
A. Model Codes and Principles
Internationally, the most commonly recognized model procurement
code is the 1994 UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods,
Construction and Services.91 According to UNCITRAL, at least seven-
teen nations have modeled at least some part of their procurement
89. Our cynicism stems not only from the vagaries of global cooperation and convergence,
but also from domestic experience. More than two decades have passed since the putatively
uniform U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) system first became effective, on April 1, 1984.
See generally JAMES F. NAGLE, A HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING, Ch. 22, “The Modern Era: A
Sea of Paperwork” (1992) (discussing the evolution of the uniform regulation system). Since then,
Balkanization has reigned. For example, the mid-1990’s witnessed a tsunami of procurement
reforms intended to make the procurement system less bureaucratic and more businesslike.
Wide-reaching reform statutes, such as the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243, the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 (FARA), Pub. L. No.
104-106, Division D, §§ 4001-4402, 110 Stat. 642, and the Information Technology Management
Reform Act of 1995 (ITMRA), Pub. L. No. 104-106, Division E, §§ 5001-5703, 110 Stat. 679 (1996)
(FARA and ITMRA are now jointly known as the Clinger-Cohen Act), were implemented by new
and revised regulations, dramatically altering the Federal procurement landscape. And the calls
for reform continue unabated.
90. See ARROWSMITH, supra note 13, at 18.
91. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON PROCUREMENT OF GOODS, CONSTRUCTION AND
SERVICES WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT (1994), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/1994Model.html. Christopher Yukins serves as an
expert to the current initiative to revise and update the UNCITRAL model law.
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codes on its model law.92 The UNCITRAL model law, currently being
updated,93 is regularly cited as a template for reform.94
The UNCITRAL model law is not necessarily a tool for opening
international procurement markets, as it contemplates domestic prefer-
ences.95 But because it offers a comprehensive set of rules to frame an
efficient procurement process, the UNCITRAL model is an important
tool for harmonizing nations’ procurement codes.96 Harmonization is,
itself, a significant step forward in opening markets because consis-
tency between procurement regimes reduces costs for vendors that
seek to compete across borders, and for nations trying to improve their
own procurement systems.
There are other interesting models for procurement emerging inter-
nationally. The first is an initiative coordinated by the OECD to foster
better practices in procurement, as part of the OECD’s broader effort
to encourage development and sound governance. The OECD is made
up of industrialized donor nations, and the assessment tools it is
creating are intended, at least in part, to ensure that developing
nations use development funds in a sound, transparent manner.97 The
OECD Methodology for Assessment of National Procurement Systems98 is not
directed primarily to opening procurement markets: the OECD meth-
odology only discourages (and does not bar) discrimination,99 and the
purpose of the tool is to help developing nations build capacity for
92. See UNCITRAL, Status: 1994—Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and
Services, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/
1994Model_status.html (citing Albania, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Estonia, Gambia, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Mauritius, Mongolia, Poland, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Tanzania, Uganda,
and Uzbekistan).
93. See, e.g., Sandra M. Rocks & Kate A. Sawyer, International Commercial Law: 2005 Develop-
ments, 61 BUS. LAW. 1633, 1633-34 (2006); Christopher Yukins, Don Wallace, Jr., Jason Matechak &
Jeffrey Marburg-Goodman, International Legal Development in Review: 2005 Corporate—International
Procurement, 40 INT’L LAW. 337, 337-43 (2006).
94. See, e.g., Sue Arrowsmith, Public Procurement: An Appraisal of the UNCITRAL Model Law as a
Global Standard, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 17, 20-22 (2004) (noting other national procurement
regimes that have looked to UNCITRAL model law).
95. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 91, art. 8(1) & Guide to Enactment ¶ 25.
96. See, e.g., John Linarelli, The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement and the UNCITRAL
Model Procurement Law, 1 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 317 (2006).
97. See OECD, New Common Benchmarking and Assessment Tool for Public Procurement
Systems (Version 4), http://www.oecd.org/document/40/0,2340,en_2649_19101395_37130152_
1_1_1_1,00.html.
98. See OECD, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS (2006),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/36/37130136.pdf.
99. See id. at 11-12.
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development,100 not necessarily to open markets.
Another interesting model for harmonization is the “Integrity Pacts”
being sponsored by Transparency International, a leading interna-
tional organization battling corruption.101 Transparency Internation-
al’s Integrity Pacts include agreements to be entered into by the
purchasing agency and all bidders. Per those agreements, none of the
parties is to engage in bribery or collude with competitors during
formation or administration of the subject contract, and a monitoring
system is to be put in place to ensure compliance.102 These Integrity
Pacts, however, are focused primarily on ensuring integrity, are limited
to specific projects or procurements rather than state-wide regimes,
and are not likely to serve as ready instruments to open international
markets.
B. Procurement Guidelines of Development Banks
Another source of guidance and potential liberalization for procure-
ment regimes worldwide derives from the guidelines from the World
Bank and the regional development banks,103 to which borrower
nations generally must conform in order to qualify for financing.104
100. See id. at 2.
101. See Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
102. See Transparency International, Integrity Pacts, http://www.transparency.org/global_
priorities/public_contracting/integrity_pacts (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
103. See African Development Bank, http://www.afdb.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2007); Asian
Development Bank, Procurement Guidelines, http://www.adb.org/Documents/Guidelines/
Procurement (last visited Apr. 5, 2007); Eur. Dev. Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., Procurement
Policies and Rules, supra note 79; Inter-American Development Bank, Procurement Procedures,
http://www.iadb.org/exr/english/BUSINESS_OPP/bus_opp_procurem_procedurs.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 5, 2007); North American Development Bank, http://www.nadbank.org (last visited
Apr. 5, 2007).
104. See, e.g., World Bank, Information for Borrowers, http://www.worldbank.org (follow
“Projects & Operations” hyperlink; then follow “Procurement / Tender” hyperlink; then follow
“Information for Borrowers” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
When the World Bank provides financing to its member countries for investment
projects, each project is governed by a legal agreement between the World Bank and
the government agency who receives the funds. One of the key obligations in the ‘loan
agreement’ is that governments abide by the Bank’s procurement policies as detailed in
the Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and the Guidelines: Selection
and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers.
Id. See also Juan Rovira, Trade Agreements, Intellectual Property, and the Role of the World Bank in
Improving Access to Medicines in Developing Countries, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 401 (2004)
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Development banks routinely impose minimum procurement rules to
ensure transparency, competition, and integrity in the projects they
fund.
The World Bank’s guidelines, for example, help open procurement
markets by requiring that vendors from all nations be allowed an
opportunity to provide goods and services,105 though the guidelines
also allow for certain domestic preferences for goods from borrower
nations.106 Moreover, the World Bank’s procurement guidelines apply,
by their terms, only to the contracts supported with World Bank
funding.107 Because they simultaneously stipulate open markets but
allow for some measure of domestic protectionism to help economies
recover, the procurement guidelines promulgated by the World Bank
and the other banks, while an important means of opening interna-
tional procurement markets, are not likely to bring about worldwide
reform. The purpose of the various banks’ guidelines is simply to
ensure that the banks’ funds are well spent—not to force open the
procurement process of reluctant borrower nations.108 The develop-
ment banks’ guidelines are not, therefore, necessarily the shortest path
to an international open market in procurement.
C. Treaties and Directives: International and Regional
As neither model codes nor the procurement guidelines of interna-
tional development banks will likely bring about open international
(providing a list of procurement methods permitted under the World Bank’s procurement
guidelines); David A. Levy, BOT and Public Procurement: A Conceptual Framework, 7 IND. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 95 (1996) (arguing that the World Bank’s procurement guidelines have contradic-
tory tenets that undermine its stated preference for open procurement markets); J.M. Migai
Akech, Development Partners and Governance of Public Procurement in Kenya: Enhancing Democracy in the
Administration of Aid, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 829 (2005) (arguing that the World Bank’s tying
of the aid given to developing countries to the requirement of compliance with its international
procurement guidelines is both inefficient and works against the efforts of recipient nations to
gain a foothold in international trade); Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under Interna-
tional Law, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 345, 400 (2000) (describing the World Bank’s procurement
guidelines as its major vehicle used to combat corruption).
105. See, WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES: PROCUREMENT UNDER IBRD LOANS AND IDA CREDITS ¶ 1.6
(revised Oct. 1, 2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/
Resources/ProcGuid-10-06-ev1.doc.
106. Id. ¶ 2.55.
107. Id. ¶ 1.5.
108. See, e.g., EBRD—Policies, supra note 79 (“The EBRD’s Procurement Policies and Rules
are based on the fundamental principles of non-discrimination, fairness and transparency. They
are designed to promote efficiency and effectiveness and to minimise credit risk in the implemen-
tation of the Bank’s lending and investment operations.”).
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public procurement markets, we look now to treaties and similar
international instruments directed specifically to opening regional or
international spheres of free trade in procurement to affect this
desired outcome.
The central example of this type of agreement is the World Trade
Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).109
The GPA is a plurilateral agreement that binds only member na-
tions.110 Per Article III of the agreement, the two basic principles at the
core of the GPA are non-discrimination (no discrimination amongst
covered foreign suppliers, goods or services) and national treatment
(foreign suppliers, goods and services are to receive treatment no less
favorable than that accorded locals).111 The substantive provisions of
the GPA—those that prescribe procurement rules to root out discrimi-
nation rather than those that describe the agencies, goods and services
covered—were recently revised, and the proposed text of the revised
GPA was published in December 2006.112
109. Although the agreement’s technical name in the WTO is the “Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement,” in the United States, the GPA is commonly referred to as the “Government
Procurement Agreement,” see, e.g., FAR, 48 C.F.R. 25.400(a)(1), and for consistency’s sake we will
use the common acronym “GPA”—also used by the WTO—here. For a comparative discussion of
the GPA and other initiatives in international agreements on procurement trade, see Simon J.
Evenett, Is There a Case for New Multilateral Rules on Transparency in Government Procurement? (2003),
reprinted in EVENETT & HOEKMAN, supra note 12, at 147. For histories of the GPA and its predecessor
agreements, see Robert D. Anderson, Policy and Legal Frameworks for Open Procurement Markets: The
Role of the WTO (paper for presentation at the West/Thomson Government Contracts Year in
Review Conference, Washington, D.C., Feb. 2007) (copy on file with authors); Annet Blank &
Gabrielle Marceau, The History of the Government Procurement Negotiations Since 1945 (1996), reprinted
in EVENETT & HOEKMAN, supra note 12, at 3; ARROWSMITH, supra note 13, at 25-47; Gerard De Graaf
& Matthew King, Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT
Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round, 29 INT’L LAW. 435 (1995);
Michael T. Janik, A U.S. Perspective on the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement, 20 GEO. WASH.
J. INT’L L. & ECON. 491 (1987).
110. These currently include Canada, the European Communities (including its 25 member
States: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), Hong Kong
China, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Netherlands with respect to Aruba, Norway,
Singapore, Switzerland, and the United States.
111. See, e.g., Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 11, at 4-5. Here, we use the term “nondiscrimi-
nation” more broadly, to describe a general policy of not discriminating against foreign suppliers
in procurement.
112. See, e.g., Greater Clarity is Focus of Updated WTO GPA, 3 INT’L GOV. CONTRACTOR ¶ 102 (Dec.
2006). For a discussion of proposed areas of reform in the GPA, see Sue Arrowsmith, Reviewing the
GPA: the Role and Development of the Plurilateral Agreement after Doha, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 761 (2002).
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In parallel with the GPA, the United States and other states have
entered into bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements (FTAs)
which include commitments to open procurement markets.113 While
these types of bilateral and multilateral agreements typically provide
for nondiscrimination and may spur broader liberalization,114 the
agreements, by their terms, are limited in scope and cannot create a
truly international open procurement market.
Another model of a market-opening international accord is the
European procurement directives; indeed, many aspects of the GPA
originally came from earlier European directives.115 As Arrowsmith
noted, the European directives, like the WTO’s Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement, offer a “skeletal” set of requirements for member
states’ procurement systems; these minimum requirements are de-
signed to eliminate barriers between the European member states’
procurement markets. Over time, the European directives have be-
come more prescriptive. Given additional force by interpretive rulings
from the European Court of Justice, the European directives have
evolved into something much closer to a common code for the
European member states.116 This evolution toward a common, harmo-
nized code has been driven, in important part, by a continuing desire
in the European central institutions to eliminate discriminatory procure-
ment rules that impede trade between member states.117
Another example of a regional directive is that of the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). With support
from the African Development Bank, COMESA has been developing its
113. See, e.g., Jean Heilman Grier, Recent Developments in International Trade Agreements Covering
Government Procurement, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 385 (2006) (discussing FTAs in place or under
negotiation); Robert C. Taylor & Lisa M. Bolton, Overview of Canadian Government Procurement Law,
42 PROCUREMENT LAW. 14 (Fall 2006) (discussing role of North America Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in Canadian procurement regime); Laura Eyester, NAFTA and the Barriers to Federal
Procurement Opportunities in the United States, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 695 (2002); Donald P. Arnavas &
Nick Seddon, The U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement—Focus on Government Procurement, 3 INT’L GOV.
CONTRACTOR ¶ 58 (July 2006); Tsai-yu Lin, Regional Procurement Arrangements in East Asia: Some
Reflections for the WTO Rules, 1 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 343, 357-59 (2006)
(discussing interplay between East Asian free trade arrangements and GPA); Locknie Hsu,
Government Procurement: A View from Asia, 1 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 379 (2006)
(reviewing regional agreements).
114. See Tsai-yu Lin, supra note 113, at 356-60.
115. See De Graaf & King, supra note 109, at 437. See generally Arrowsmith, Evolution, supra
note 66, at 340; Jean-Jacques Verdeaux, Public Procurement in the European Union and in the United
States: a Comparative Study, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 713 (2003).
116. See Arrowsmith, Evolution, supra note 66, at 350-54.
117. See id. at 339.
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own procurement directives to facilitate procurement in and among its
member states.118 While that effort remains in process, it illustrates
both promise and risk: it shows the hoped-for benefit of harmonized
procurement schemes outside the highly industrialized world, but it
also raises a risk of a balkanized international patchwork of regional
procurement regions. We will return, below, to the question of harmo-
nization.
IV. ACHIEVING A GLOBAL PROCUREMENT MARKET: FOUR STEPS
Having reviewed the barriers to international procurement, and the
instruments available to reduce them, we turn now to four critical steps
needed for the global procurement market to fully achieve openness.
While it might prove convenient for this process to proceed in an
orderly, linear fashion, it is more likely that passage through the four
stages will be irregular, overlapping, disorderly, and perhaps even
chaotic. Nonetheless, we sense that all four steps are necessary for a
global procurement regime to enjoy credibility at home and abroad, to
provide customer satisfaction, and to produce value for money in an
efficient and consistent manner.
The first step, logically, is the political decision to embrace value-
based outcomes, reject domestic preferences, and ultimately accept
nondiscrimination as a norm, or as a universally accepted procurement
“best practice”. Of course, such a decision must overcome deep native
protectionism. The second step is harmonization, because uniformity
(in vocabulary and practice) generates efficiencies not only for buyers
but for sellers. To be clear, as pragmatists, we neither expect nor
118. See generally Press Release, COMESA, Public Procurement Rules and Regulations Har-
monised (June 4, 2004), http://www.comesa.int/trade/issues/procurement/MS-Office-
Document.2004-06-04.5502/view; COMESA, Public Procurement Information System, http://
simba.comesa.int:90/cpis/index.php?sz1024&langenglish (last visited Apr. 5, 2007); COMESA,
REPORT OF THE FIRST STAKEHOLDERS FORUM FOR THE COMESA PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REFORM
PROJECT (Dec. 2002), available at http://simba.comesa.int:90/cpis/uploads/reports/
Report%20of%20First%20Stakeholders%20Forum.doc (describing scope and purpose of project
to develop COMESA directives); STEPHEN KARANGIZI, COMESA, REGIONAL PROCUREMENT REFORM
INITIATIVE (Dec. 2002), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/wkshop_tanz_jan03/
karangizi1_e.doc (describing projected steps in development of the COMESA procurement
directives and institutional structure); Press Release, EVD, Afrika: Multinational/COMESA—
Proposal for an ADF Grant of UA 5,660,000 to Finance the Enhancing Procurement Reforms and
Capacity Project (July 20, 2006), http://www.evd.nl (describing COMESA project and next steps);
Press Release, African Development Bank, COMESA—US$ 8 Million Grant in Support of Public
Procurement (Aug. 14, 2006), http://www.afdb.org (announcing a grant to continue COMESA
initiative).
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advocate for standardization or harmonization of entire procurement
codes. Rather, we anticipate continuing harmonization of central
agreements—such as the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procure-
ment—which in turn shape individual nations’ procurement codes.
The third step is rationalization, the process of ensuring that the
instruments being relied upon by individual states to open markets do,
in fact, produce a legislative and regulatory template for procurement
procedures which are fundamentally sound (e.g., reflect best practices)
and which produce efficient, value-based results. The final step we
envision is institutionalization, the process of transitioning harmo-
nized, rationalized agreements from empty rhetoric (or toothless legal
regimes) into properly-implemented policies and practices that be-
come integrated into the fabric of the states that join those agreements.
We recognize that, to some extent, each of the four stages could
serve to reinforce another. For example, we assume that, if a state
affirmatively embraces harmonization, we expect that rationalization
and institutionalization might (but need not necessarily) naturally
follow. At the same time, we concede that, for a number of reasons, the
process might implode during any of the four stages.
A. Intermezzo: Of Political Will and Stakeholders
Any discussion of political decision-making must begin with, and in
large part depends upon, an understanding of, or at least familiarity
with, the various affected interest groups or stakeholders. We have long
perceived that this fundamental issue—identifying and understanding
the interests and priorities of the various stakeholders in public procure-
ment—is a critical yet under-explored piece of the public procurement
policy puzzle. Unfortunately, this topic is beyond the scope of this
article. Nonetheless, we pause here to catalogue some of the major
players, because it is axiomatic that the political decision-making
process will be influenced, nay, skewed, as constituencies exert effort to
further their own interests.
From the perspective of contract law, it seems logical to begin by
identifying the interested parties; there are buyers—here, governments,
agencies, ministries, or purchasing officials—and sellers—contractors,
vendors, or suppliers, publicly traded or closely held, whether for profit
(which represents the lion’s share) or not for profit. Within the seller
or contractor community, we tend to distinguish truly commercial firms
from those primarily non-commercial firms that sell exclusively to, and
thus entirely depend upon, the government; and further, particularly
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for this purpose, domestic from foreign firms.119 On the buyer side, the
government’s interest may vary as we focus upon the interests of the end
user (e.g., the pilot of a military aircraft, a judge working in a federal
court house), the source of funds (whether the head of agency, tasked with
achieving specific missions or mandates, or the legislative appropria-
tor) seeking to allocate scarce resources among unlimited demands for
government services, or various accountability organizations (such as
audit or oversight instrumentalities tasked with protecting the public
fisc).120 The nature of public procurement requires inclusion of the
public or citizens (individually or collectively), as taxpayers (whose funds
are being spent) or as consumers (or recipients of government services),
in the roster of relevant parties.
Further, particularly in an open, democratic society, special interests
play a key role as they compete for their “piece of the procurement
pie.” In the United States, a short list of these interests might include
small businesses, women-owned businesses, minority-owned firms, ser-
vice-disabled veteran-owned firms, commercial firms, domestic produc-
ers, labor unions, firms located in areas of high unemployment, and
environmentally-friendly procurement advocates.121 Finally, for our
119. Experience suggests further subdivision to the extent that, for some purposes, the
distinction between domestic and foreign firms may depend upon, for example, ownership or
location of the corporate headquarters or, in other circumstances, where the work is performed.
See generally 48 C.F.R. § 25.003 (2007) (“‘Domestic end product’ means—(1) An unmanufactured
end product mined or produced in the United States; or (2) An end product manufactured in the
United States, if the cost of its components mined, produced, or manufactured in the United
States exceeds 50 percent of the cost of all its components. . . .”).
120. A simple anecdote offers a window into the range of competing interests. A legislator
responsible for defense appropriations must make difficult decisions relating to, for example, air
superiority; the legislator must balance the number of aircraft to buy and the amount of resources
to be invested in maximizing a given aircraft’s speed, agility, range, or ability to carry armaments.
A legislator might reasonably conclude that a greater number of less potent aircraft would
increase the likelihood of mission success (and taxpayers, as a whole, may or may not agree).
Contrast this with a customer satisfaction model focused upon the government’s end user, the
fighter pilot (or wing commander) who would typically (for obvious reasons) express a strong
preference for the maximum amount of speed, agility, range, and ability to carry armaments
without regard for price. Of course, these considerations could become increasingly hypothetical
as the military increases its reliance upon U.A.V.’s or unmanned aerial vehicles. See, e.g., Charles
Duhigg, The Pilotless Plane That Only Looks Like Child’s Play, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2007, at BU1 (“For
years, . . . U.A.V.’s, . . . were pariahs within the military industry, [which . . .] saw them as threats to
the status quo . . . . ‘For a long time, the only thing most generals could agree on was that they
didn’t want any unmanned vehicles,’ says Senator John W. Warner, the Virginia Republican who is
a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. ‘Now everyone wants as many as they can
get.’”).
121. See, e.g., the discussion of wealth distribution in Schooner, supra note 18.
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purposes, this discussion could not be complete without recognition of
the facilitators of transparency, the media outlets (print, electronic,
audio, visual, etc.) that not only educate the public (taxpayers and
vendors alike) but perform a valuable third-party oversight role in the
procurement process.
B. Nondiscrimination
The first and most political step is to embrace nondiscrimination by
deciding to open a state’s domestic procurement market to interna-
tional competition. Practically speaking, there is no way in a modern,
globalized economy to seal off any domestic procurement system
completely; any modern government relies, to some extent, on foreign
vendors for goods or services.122 The decision is one of degree, then,
but the experience of most nations—including the United States—is
that opening a domestic procurement market can be politically wrench-
ing and difficult, with considerations that carry well beyond the procure-
ment rules themselves.123
As the discussion of the U.S. experience above reflected, market
opening can be driven by unexpected proponents in the agencies
themselves. Agency personnel—the customers affected by market barri-
ers—may push to reduce domestic preferences because of the difficulty
of compliance,124 because of annoyed indifference to a collateral social
goal that is impeding trade,125 or simply because trade-impeding
corruption will be prosecuted and destroyed as matter of course.
Some benefits weighing in favor of an open domestic procurement
market were discussed above. But, for less obvious reasons, joining a
liberalizing international regime may prove very useful for regimes
with a procurement system riddled with inefficient standards and
122. Cf. Manickam Supperamaniam, Asian Perspective on Government Procurement Matters, 1
ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 291, 292-93 (2006) (Malaysia requires that local sources
be used, unless requirement cannot be filled by local sources).
123. See, e.g., ARROWSMITH, supra note 13, at 11-12 (reviewing political constraints on achiev-
ing free trade); De Graaf & King, supra note 109, at 442-43 (describing respective negotiation
objectives of EU and United States in entering into 1994 GPA); Margaret Liang, Government
Procurement at the GATT/WTO: 25 Years of Plurilateral Framework, 1 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 277, 282-84 (2006) (reviewing costs and benefits to developing nations); Bernard
Hoekman, Using International Institutions to Improve Public Procurement, 13 WORLD BANK RES.
OBSERVER 249 (1998), available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/journals/wbro/obsaug98/
pdf/article6.pdf (reviewing economics literature regarding costs and benefits of nondiscrimina-
tion).
124. See Berry Amendment discussion, supra Part II.A.
125. See Accessibility Requirements discussion, supra Part II.B.
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requirements. Opening and subjecting domestic markets to interna-
tional standards for sound procurement may incidentally clear away
those inefficient domestic procurement practices.126
The costs of opening procurement markets are usually highly spe-
cific to individual nations because those nations are typically using
protectionist procurement policies to shelter strategic domestic indus-
tries. What is common across the globe, however, is that the nondiscrimi-
nation decision to open a domestic procurement market can typically
be highly centralized and made by a few key decisionmakers. That is
not always true, of course; the debate over whether to discriminate
against foreign specialty metals has drawn in many hundreds of stake-
holders across the U.S. procurement market. In principle, however,
nondiscrimination can be tightly controlled by a political elite, unlike
harmonization, rationalization, and institutionalization, discussed be-
low.
C. Harmonization
The next step is to harmonize international instruments for opening
markets.127 Harmonization need not be overly specific, but requires a
common set of carefully defined “bounding” rules or a “constitution,”
such as the GPA or the EU Directives.
Harmonization may seem, to some, a radical idea. If the goal of these
instruments is simply to open markets which are at very different stages
of development, one might argue that harmonizing the instruments—
aligning the WTO GPA and the COMESA procurement directives, for
126. See Victor Mosoti, The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: A Necessary Evil in the
Legal Strategy for Development in the Poor World?, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 593 (2004). Mosoti notes:
What is distressing, however, is that some of the poorer countries’ decision not to sign
the WTO GPA seems guided by priorities that are defeated by other factors inherent in
these countries, and have nothing to do with a careful and honest assessment of what
the nations really stand to gain or lose by signing. In offering the explanation that they
would like to shield their domestic suppliers from external competition for government
tenders, and nurture various strategic sectors, these countries are deliberately missing
the point. They are being bled to ruination by terribly warped procurement laws and
policies.
Id. at 596.
127. See, e.g., Arrowsmith, supra note 94, at 23-24 (discussing need for harmonization); Sue
Arrowsmith, Transparency in Government Procurement (2003), reprinted in EVENETT & HOEKMAN, supra
note 12, at 126, 137 (discussing lack of transparency in rules as an independent barrier to foreign
vendors).
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example—is beside the point. Harmonization is essential, though, if
progress is to continue in opening world procurement markets.128 At
the broadest level, harmonization will help to transfer lessons learned
between different systems which are now relying on different integra-
tive instruments. At the same time, and through the same process,
harmonization will help to highlight the nagging problems buried in
those instruments; this will be the first step towards “rationalization,”
discussed below.
If, as seems likely, harmonization centers on the WTO Government
Procurement Agreement, harmonization will afford additional ben-
efits. Integrating strands of many international procurement instru-
ments through a revised GPA will help to win over those who fear that
the GPA is merely a hegemonic instrument for opening markets, and
not a tool for improving procurement systems in the developing world.
Realistically, harmonization (as suggested above) is likely to occur
through the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, in part for
purely practical reasons: the United States’ federal procurement mar-
ket is by far the largest national procurement market in the world, and
under U.S. law, the GPA in essence creates a “walled garden” excluding
those outside the GPA. Under U.S. law, generally only GPA members
and those nations with bilateral arrangements with the United States
may trade freely into the U.S. procurement market. Thus, under the
Trade Agreements Act,129 as implemented by the Federal Acquisition
Regulation,130 U.S. government contracting personnel may (subject to
certain exceptions) purchase goods and services only from nations that
are members of the GPA or have joined the United States in regional or
bilateral arrangements, such as the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA). This legal “walled garden” which generally affords
non-discrimination only to those nations inside the GPA (or inside
other, typically bilateral, U.S. agreements) is explicitly designed to
encourage other nations to join agreements with the United States to
open their procurement markets.131
128. Cf. 19 U.S.C. § 2514(a) (President is to press for harmonization to encourage broader
opportunities in international procurement trade).
129. See generally 19 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2518. See also 19 U.S.C. § 2511(a), (b); 19 U.S.C. § 2512.
130. See FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 25.403(c) (2007).
131. See 19 U.S.C. § 2512; Angela B. Styles, Robert K. Huffman & Lara Covington, GSA Trade
Agreements Certification: an Ambush for Commercial Providers, 41 PROCUREMENT LAW. 1 (2006)
(discussing serious potential fraud liability for vendors that provide goods from non-GPA
nations); John A. Howell, The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 Versus the Buy American Act: The Irresistible
Force Meets the Immovable Object, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 495 (2006); Thomas C. Lowinger, Discrimination
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In order to access the U.S. procurement market developing nations
will either need to join a bilateral free trade agreement with the United
States (which is growing increasingly difficult, because the President
will likely soon lose his “fast-track” negotiation authority), or—more
likely—to join the GPA. The opportunity offered by the huge U.S.
procurement market thus makes it more likely that developing nations
will, over time, be drawn to the GPA; on balance, therefore, harmoniza-
tion in public procurement is more likely to progress under the GPA.
Unlike nondiscrimination, which is typically a political decision
made to further carefully calculated political and economic goals,
harmonization is a more technical endeavor, as experts work to harmo-
nize different regimes’ procurement rules. Harmonization is more
technically complex, however, if the goal is not just to harmonize
nondiscrimination agreements, but also to create a technically ad-
vanced set of procurement rules—if, in other words, harmonization is
to evolve naturally into rationalization, the logical next step in this
process. If that broader harmonization is to succeed, the harmoniza-
tion process should be fully transparent, and there must be robust
communication between the various organizations developing interna-
tional standards for procurement.
D. Rationalization
Rationalization involves improving international instruments to maxi-
mize efficiency in procurement systems. It can enhance domestic
welfare and facilitate international trade, but poses a challenge to the
GPA and other market-opening instruments. If the goal is only to
harmonize international commitments not to discriminate, that can be
done in a few paragraphs; harmonization is relatively simple, and no
real rationalization is needed, because the states joining the instrument
will be agreeing only to foreswear discrimination.
If the goal is broader, though, to agree to reduce irrational barriers
to efficient procurement, “rationalization” becomes much more com-
plicated and difficult. It means reopening the international instru-
ments to reduce explicit and hidden barriers to international procure-
ment—and, in the process, to improve the efficiency of procurement
in Government Procurement of Foreign Goods in the U.S. and Western Europe (1976), reprinted in EVENETT
& HOEKMAN, supra note 12, at 319, 326 (earlier study suggests that GPA and Trade Agreements Act,
which came later, had important impact on U.S. procurement in neutralizing discrimination
under the Buy American Act, for 1976 study suggested “that the ‘Buy American’ policy has had a
significant impact in curtailing U.S. government procurement of imports”).
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systems in each of the signatory states. This is a very sophisticated,
technical undertaking requiring extensive data on the member na-
tions’ existing procurement regimes, on how advanced those procure-
ment systems are, and on the procurement strategies that those mem-
ber nations should (and should not) rely upon.132 Drawing a common
regulatory thread among the member states—setting a lowest common
denominator for fair procurement by international agreement—is
difficult,133 but not impossible.
An example illustrates the promise and perils of rationalization. As
noted above, “framework” agreements have emerged as a critical issue
in U.S. and European procurement systems. Framework agreements
offer enormous promise by allowing agencies (often centralized pro-
curement agencies) to establish standing contracts for commodity
goods and services that reduce the time, expense and frustrations
normally part of government procurement. Yet absent careful regula-
tion, framework agreements can erode nondiscrimination commit-
ments by quietly destroying the competition and transparency that are
vital to a truly open procurement regime. In the United States, frame-
work agreements have swallowed up billions of dollars in largely
noncompetitive, nontransparent procurement, creating an invisible
“gap” in the U.S. commitment to open its procurement market to its
132. For example, less developed procurement regimes, in an effort to minimize corruption,
maximize competition, and increase transparency, tend to favor publicly disclosed bids or tenders
with low price determining contractor success. More advanced regimes tend to employ “alterna-
tive means of competitive procurement that are better suited to the production of . . . complex
goods and services—competitive negotiation techniques—[that] are more susceptible to subjec-
tivity, bias, favouritism, and corruption.” See generally Joshua I. Schwartz, Learning From the United
States’ Procurement Law Experience: On “Law Transfer” And Its Limitations, 11 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 115,
119 (2002). Schwartz suggests that:
[T]he progression . . . from tendering systems in which the primary criterion for award
of a contract among the field of competitors is the lowest price, to a best value system in
which a much more extensive list of criteria is assessed to evaluate the quality of the
goods or services offered, is one that developing procurement systems may be well
advised to retrace, rather than race to the (temporary) end-state of best value procure-
ment.
Id. at 121.
133. While corruption control is a common and entirely reasonable metric upon which to
judge a procurement regime, Schwartz recognizes “that rigidly controlled procurement often fails
to allow procurement officers to achieve good results for the government, especially in a dynamic
environment.” Id. at 120. Moreover, procurement reform always entails a balancing act. See also
Schooner, supra note 18.
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trading partners.
A simple international nondiscrimination agreement would not
need to address framework agreements; indeed, even the recently
revised GPA does not do so. That begs the question, however, of how to
resolve framework agreements’ potentially corrosive effect on interna-
tional trade and member nations’ own procurement systems. Rational-
ization of the GPA (or any other international instrument) would
require assessing framework agreements’ benefits and risks, and setting
benchmarks for acceptable standards. By doing so, rationalization
would enhance the GPA and the procurement systems of its member
nations, improving both international trade and domestic efficiency.
The GPA would gain legitimacy in the eyes of nonmember nations as a
result, no longer viewed as merely as a wedge to open their domestic
procurement markets to international vendors, but as a reliable tool for
enhancing their own procurement regimes.
E. Institutionalization
The last step in opening public procurement markets, after harmoni-
zation and rationalization, is what we call here “institutionalization.” As
international procurement instruments expand their reach and ad-
dress more complex barriers to trade, the key challenge will be to
“institutionalize” the commitments those instruments make by working
them into the fabric of member nations’ procurement regimes.134
There are a number of tools to “institutionalize,” from training procure-
ment officials and private firms in commonly accepted practices from
open, competitive procurement regimes, to building states’ institu-
tional capacity to oversee and manage procurement. One of the
readiest tools to ensure “institutionalization” would be a remedial
means for competitors—prospective contractors—to enforce states’
commitments.135 The United States’ experience in this regard shows
the value of an effective remedies system in “institutionalization,” and
the shortcomings in the current treaty structure.
In the United States, concerned vendors may quite easily challenge
the terms of a solicitation or award as discriminatory or illegal. There
134. See, e.g., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 91, at Guide to Enactment ¶¶ 36-40 (noting
suggested steps for implementing UNCITRAL model law).
135. See generally Daniel I. Gordon, Constructing a Bid Protest Process: the Choices that Every
Procurement Challenge System Must Make, 35 PUB. CONT. L. J. 427 (2006); Harvey Gordon, Shane
Rimmer & Sue Arrowsmith, The Economic Impact of the European Union Regime on Public Procurement:
Lessons for the WTO (1998), reprinted in EVENETT & HOEKMAN, supra note 12, at 431, 453 (arguing for
effective remedies regime for enforcement).
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are at least three established fora for such challenges, which are known
as “bid protests” in the United States: the Government Accountability
Office (which hears more than a thousand such challenges each year),
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (which hears far fewer), and the
contracting agencies themselves (which generally do not publish statis-
tics on agency-level protests).136 A vendor may bring a bid protest in
any of these fora, and can generally rely on a prompt and objective
review of the vendor’s concerns with appropriate remedies. Over many
decades, the U.S. bid protest system has evolved into an effective means
of ensuring competition, transparency, integrity, and accountability in
the federal procurement system.137 By affording a ready enforcement
mechanism to vendors when the law is not followed, this mature bid
protest system thus “institutionalizes” the procurement rules into the
daily workings of the procurement system.
Current international instruments do not necessarily afford vendors
(or other stakeholders) the same ready means of protest. The GPA, for
example, requires that member states incorporate its requirements
into their national laws and establish a forum to hear protests regard-
ing violations of national law (“national challenge procedures”), but
does not require that vendors be allowed to protest violations of the
GPA.138 Thus, if a member state violates the GPA and there is no
corresponding violation of domestic law, the injured vendor’s only
recourse under the GPA is to complain to the vendor’s government,
which in turn may seek relief from the discriminating government.139
The U.S. Commerce Department describes this process on its website
by suggesting that government officials can help injured vendors
understand their rights under the GPA, ask foreign officials to review
the matter, or invoke the WTO dispute settlement process as a last
136. We view this election of forum as a historical oddity, and do not, as a matter of policy,
suggest that it is efficient or optimal. Indeed, one of us has criticized the current regime at length.
Steven L. Schooner, The Future: Scrutinizing the Empirical Case for the Court of Federal Claims, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 714, 755-56, 768-70 (2003); Steven L. Schooner, Feature Comment, Watching The
Sunset: Anticipating GAO’s Study Of Concurrent Bid Protest Jurisdiction in the COFC and the District
Courts, 42 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 108 (2000).
137. Indeed, we view this as a crucial form of third-party oversight of the procurement
process. Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: the Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government, 50
AM. U. L. REV. 627, 691-93 (2001).
138. See ARROWSMITH, supra note 13, at 386 (noting that if a member state has failed to
incorporate a GPA requirement into domestic law, the injured vendor may in effect have no
recourse through “national challenge” procedures based on national law).
139. Id. at 358-84 (discussing the process under the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism).
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resort.140
As the Commerce Department’s explanation suggests, instead of
bringing a direct protest, the vendor must ask its home government to
intervene with the offending government, and then, if that fails, to
invoke the dispute process under the WTO.141 It is extremely unlikely,
however, that a system this unwieldy will truly institutionalize the GPA.
Indeed, in its decade of existence, there have been only three matters
brought under the current Government Procurement Agreement,142
two of which (the consolidated matters relating to United States
procurement) ended before decision, when the issue, a Massachusetts
boycott against Myanmar, was addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court.143
Notably, possibly the most publicized event in the GPA’s nondiscrimi-
nation regime—the United States’ December 2003 announcement144
140. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Trade Compliance Ctr., Exporter’s Guide to WTO
Agreement on Government Procurement, http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/Exporters_
Guides/List_All_Guides/exp_005325.asp.
141. See generally Christopher F. Corr & Kristina Zissis, Convergence and Opportunity: the WTO
Government Procurement Agreement and U.S. Procurement Reform, 18 N.Y.L SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 303
(1999) (discussing vendors’ practical difficulty in using cumbersome WTO process).
142. See Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Government Procurement, WT/DS163/R (May
1, 2000), http://docsonline.wto.org (search “Document Symbol” for “WT/DS163/R); Request
for Consultations by the European Communities, United States—Measure Affecting Government
Procurement, WT/DS88/1 (June 26, 1997), http://docsonline.wto.org (search “Document Sym-
bol” for “WT/DS88/1”); Request for Consultations by Japan, United States—Measure Affecting
Government Procurement, WT/DS95/1 (July 21, 1997), http://docsonline.wto.org (search “Docu-
ment Symbol” for “WT/DS95/1”).
143. See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (declaring Massachusetts’
procurement boycott unconstitutional because of preemption by federal law); ARROWSMITH, supra
note 13, at 327-28 (discussing procedural history); Mitsuo Matsushita, Major WTO Dispute Cases
Concerning Government Procurement, 1 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 299, 300 (2006); see
also WTO, Disputes Gateway, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_
e.htm (database of WTO disputes).
144. See Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Determination and Findings (Dec. 5,
2003), stating, inter alia, that “essential security interests of the United States” necessitated that
competition for a projected $18.6 billion in contracts to “upgrade and rebuild [Iraq’s] electrical
sector, public works and water, military courts and borders, building, housing and health,
transportation, communications, and oil infrastructure” be limited to firms from the U.S., Iraq,
and “coalition partners and force contributing nations.” This action was noteworthy, not only
because no nation formally challenged it, but also because, as a matter of U.S. law, Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz may have lacked the authority to execute it. See generally 10 U.S.C.
§ 2304(c)(7), as implemented by 48 C.F.R. § 6.302-7 (2007), indicating that: “Limitations. . . . A
written determination to use this authority shall be made . . . by . . . The Secretary of Defense . . .
or . . . [t]he head of any other executive agency. This authority may not be delegated.” See also 48
C.F.R. § 206.302-7, “Limitations. For the defense agencies, the written determination to use this
authority must be made by the Secretary of Defense.” (Emphasis in the original.)
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that it would not open prime contracts for Iraqi reconstruction to
prime contractors from nations, including GPA member nations, that
did not join the coalition that invaded Iraq—was apparently never
raised in a WTO proceeding.145 Political concerns may overwhelm even
serious violations of the GPA, and the enforcement mechanism cur-
rently in place holds little guarantee of “institutionalizing” the GPA’s
rules; member states are, for most practical purposes, on their honor to
bring their procurement systems into compliance with the GPA. As the
international procurement system matures, therefore, and as the GPA’s
rules become a more central part of states’ procurement regimes, it
may prove vitally important to expand vendors’ ability to bring “chal-
lenges” directly under the GPA.
V. CONCLUSION: A GLOBAL PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGIME?
The barriers that normally impede world procurement trade—
classic domestic preferences, distorting and inefficient collateral social
policies, corruption, self-serving agency “efficiencies” in procurement,
and structural barriers to entry—are slowly eroding in the face of
numerous international instruments, including various forms of agree-
ments and guidance that are helping the world procurement market
integrate. Although many nations continue to resist liberalization in
procurement, a pattern of steps (a plan of action, really, to effect
nondiscrimination) is beginning to emerge. To accept nondiscrimina-
tion as a norm—the fundamental predicate to a global procurement
market—and to permit procurement regimes to operate more smoothly,
the instruments used for guiding liberalization should be harmonized,
with an eye to rationalizing those instruments to improve efficiency.
Unlike the political decision to liberalize, which may be driven by a
political elite, harmonization and rationalization require a much
broader effort. The effort, in principle, should engage and coordinate
the many technical, legal, and trade experts responsible for improving
the instruments. Once harmonized and rationalized, the guiding instru-
ment(s) should be institutionalized, through training, capacity build-
ing, and, where appropriate, challenge mechanisms. Such institutional-
ization involves an even broader orbit of technical, legal, and
145. See, e.g., Christian Pitschas, World Trade Organisation/United States: Award of Prime Contracts
for Infrastructure Reconstruction in Iraq—an Assessment under the WTO Agreement on Government
Procurement, 13 PUB. PROC. L. REV. NA85 (2004); Owen Bonheimer, The Duty to Prevent Waste of Iraqi
Assets During Reconstruction: Taming Temptation Through ICJ Jurisdiction, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 673, 692
(2005).
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procurement personnel, as a procurement system at large is recast for
an open market. The cycle of improvement can then turn full circle as
challenges and other reviews disclose faults in the system that can be
improved—both to assure international vendors of the procurement
system’s integrity and, equally importantly, to ensure that the system
evolves towards efficient procedures that will produce optimal out-
comes. Thus, opening procurement markets should, at least in prin-
ciple, both enhance the value of goods and services bought, and
strengthen the liberalizing procurement systems themselves.
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